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It is no surprise to professional practitioners of the law that people make
mistakes. Indeed, the vast majority of professional practitioners earn a
livelihood rectifying individuals’ mistakes through litigation, legislation, or
leverage. The same practitioners are aware that rectification is best
accomplished by proactive measures, vigilance to those issues that engender
mistakes, and through active reparation, thus avoiding mistakes themselves.
Issues prompting litigation are engendered by change to the law, to the economy,
or to the intentionality of individuals in flux. Anticipating the effect of change
on individuals is the best way for practitioners to avoid mistakes.
The spate of litigation surrounding federal preemption of state statutes
pertaining to wealth transfer, resulting in unanticipated consequences of
significant economic import, illustrates many professionals are imprudently
advising clients with whom they owe a fiduciary obligation. Two forms of
fiduciary irresponsibility occur in this connection. First, professionals engage
clients in a fiduciary capacity when serving as estate planners or divorce
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practitioners.1 Second, benefit plan managers engage in a fiduciary relationship
when providing routine forms and guidelines to employees with the knowledge
that the benefits involve pension or insurance plans governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a federal program governing assets
in excess of $6.7 trillion as of 2015.2
When working with clients, estate planners and plan managers are inattentive
to the possibility of change in the client’s life, the intricacies of federal
preemption, and the interaction of the two. As such, these attorneys and plan
managers are not discharging their fiduciary duties in respect to a pension or
insurance plan in a manner consistent with the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries.3 Specifically, professionals are acting imprudently when advising
clients—or neglecting to advise clients—of the options available when the client
commences employment or subsequently, makes a significant status change
affecting assets so significant as a pension or insurance contract.
The imprudence of both types of professionals may first arise from
inattentiveness to estate planning options surrounding beneficiary designations,
and is often augmented by the failure to take adequate account of the inevitability
of changing circumstances in the participant’s life. Secondly, imprudence may
arise from the inattentiveness of ERISA plan managers regarding the forms used,
lack of periodic follow-up with clients and employees, and through failure to
assist a client with identifying intended beneficiaries. The failure of plan
managers to provide plan beneficiary designation forms that are sufficiently
comprehensive to capture the vagaries of human lifestyle changes is flagrant.
Attorneys and plan managers are somewhat aware of federal preemption,
specifically that ERISA explicitly contains a preemption clause, and that there
are multiple federal decisions applying that preemption to policy designations
covered under ERISA, the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act
(FEGLIA), and the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA).4 As a
result of these judicial opinions, plan managers and attorneys are aware that
federal preemption often contradicts the intent of a client, resulting in the unjust

1. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail
of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003).
2. S. Burcu Avci, M.P. Narayanan, & H. Nejat Seyhun, How Should Retirement Plans be
Organized?, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 337, 339 (2017); see Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie,
Accidental Inheritance: Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
165, 168–69 (2014) (noting “Americans currently hold more than $9 trillion in retirement savings
accounts”).
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
4. Id. § 1144(a); see Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1951, 1955 (2013) (holding state
law is preempted because it conflicts with FEGLIA, an insurance program for federal employees);
see, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 142 (2001) (holding that contrary state
laws are preempted by the plan term’s benefit mandate).
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enrichment of the designated plan beneficiary.5 Often, because the individual
named on the benefit form does not correspond with a client’s intent, the advisers
and plan managers are inattentive to the “central matter of plan administration.”6
Divorce is the most likely culprit—the former spouse receives the proceeds of
the plan even though this cannot be what was intended by the now deceased
client.7 This inattentiveness to the plan beneficiary designation, either when
commencing employment or at divorce, is not a frivolous pursuit because the
proceeds of the plan often form a significant component of the client’s estate.8
To illustrate the dilemma, consider a new employee who, as part of his or her
employment, participated in his or her employer’s ERISA-sponsored pension
plan. The employee designates his spouse as the plan designated beneficiary
and then directs that if there is no surviving spouse at his death, distribution is
to be made by his estate. After completing the form and filing it with the
employer’s plan manager, the employee and his spouse subsequently divorce
and the divorce decree purportedly divests the employee’s spouse of any interest
in the plan. The employee’s attorney never included a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO) as part of the divorce settlement and thereafter, despite
good intentions, the employee never removed the former spouse’s name as the
plan’s designated beneficiary. At the employee’s death, the former spouse and
the deceased employee’s estate vie for the plan’s benefits, usually a substantial
amount of money. The estate asserts the divorce severed any relationship
between the decedent and the former spouse, and also asserts the divorce decree
contained a valid waiver of any benefits signed by the former spouse.
Additionally, state law provides that a former spouse is treated as predeceased
for all inheritance purposes! Nonetheless, the former spouse argues the
employee retained the plan designated beneficiary due to residual “good will”
between the two parties and also alleges that ERISA, FEGLIA, and SGLIA are
federal plans mandating federal preemption, emphasizing that the person named
as the plan’s designated beneficiary takes despite conflicting state law. The
issue becomes who takes the proceeds?
Attorneys and laypersons alike might rationally assume the former spouse is
barred from taking because of the valid divorce decree and the signed settlement
agreement between the two parties. If this is insufficient, the state’s revocation
by operation of law statute treats each spouse as predeceased upon divorce, and
operationally bars the former spouse from taking. Surprising to many plan
participants, that is not the case. ERISA and related programs require the plan
to pay benefits strictly in accordance with the plan’s designated beneficiary rule
5. See John H. Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in
Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1665
(2014).
6. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147–48 (holding that making payment to the designated plan
beneficiary is central to administrative efficiency).
7. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 206–07.
8. See id. at 168–69.
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based on the argument that this simplifies plan administration.9 Ease of plan
administration, unhindered by various state law, the goal of Congress was to
make certain that the employee remained in charge of the designated
beneficiary.10 However, Congress failed to take into account the changes in
American society between ERISA’s enactment in 1974 and today. These
changes often thwart an employee’s intent.
Of course, private actions can prevent an unintended plan beneficiary from
taking the proceeds but one Supreme Court decision illustrates how such actions
routinely fail to materialize.11 First, if the attorney representing the employee at
the divorce hearing provided comprehensive advice, a QDRO could be filed,
thus defeating the spouse’s ability to take from the pension. As is often the case,
this was not done.12 Second, the plan manager could provide the employee with
more options on the plan’s enrollment form when the employee began
employment with the company. Third, the plan manager could continue to
notify the employee in an effort to remain current on the intent of the employee.
The employment form, meant to explain the plan and its procedures, can easily
illustrate certain changes such as divorce, remarriage, or even the birth of
children or nonmarital cohabitation. Neither the plan manager nor the forms
provided to the employee offered these options, and there was no periodic
follow-up to inquire of the employee’s current goals.13 All the while, assets in
the managed account continued to increase. Fourth, should the employee seek
assistance in creating an estate plan with an attorney, either before or after the
divorce, the estate planning professional can counsel the employee to change the
designated beneficiary on the form to correspond with the employee’s current
estate intentions. This was not done.14 There was no suggestion made in writing
by the plan manager, nor encouragement given, to direct the employee to seek
adequate legal advice.15
This Article argues there is sufficient evidence available to suggest that
private practitioners, involved in divorce litigation or estate planning, are in
breach of fiduciary duty to their clients when they fail to consider the impact of
federal preemption. Second, plan managers of ERISA, FEGLIA, and SGLIA
are imprudently providing pension plan forms to employees by failing to take
into account the vagaries of modern lifestyle changes. While this Article focuses
9. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300–01 (2009)
(stating that strict adherence to the plan beneficiary documents allows for a more simplistic and
efficient estate administration process). The result occurs if the plan involved life insurance or
disability insurance proceeds too. See, e.g., Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149–50 (holding that state statutes
prescribing a constructive knowledge standard for plan administrators are preempted, as they
conflict with ERISA’s policy of minimizing administrative and financial burdens).
10. See Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 303–04 (citing Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148–50).
11. See id. at 288.
12. Id. at 296–97.
13. See id. at 289–90.
14. Id. at 303.
15. See id. at 301–02.
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on plan managers, the liability of both groups is at issue. ERISA imposes
stringent standards on persons acting as ERISA fiduciaries,16 stipulating that
ERISA fiduciaries must “discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and the beneficiaries . . . .”17 An ERISA fiduciary
is thus confronted with the duties to prepare and maintain enhanced beneficiary
designation forms that consider the evolving intent of the
employee/accountholder, necessitating regular employee inquiries that require a
fiduciary to act upon the newly received information. This is in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries. Likewise, divorce attorneys and estate
planning attorneys, once immune from claims brought by third parties due to the
rule of privity, are now increasingly subject to suits for breach of duty,
negligence, and malpractice.18
Plan managers and attorneys often fail to apprise themselves of changes in the
law.19 One significant change is the evolution of state probate statutes which
traditionally accommodated the elusive intent of a decedent within the context
of a last will and testament, but now include beneficiary designations on
nonprobate transfer contracts, such as with pension funds or life insurance
contracts.20 Illustration of the evolution of these state statutes are the following
statutes: revocation by operation of law, antilapse, slayer statutes, elective share
computations, constructive trusts, and in a handful of states: substitute gift
rules.21 Despite uniform codes promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and attendant greater uniformity among
state rules and laws, state laws continue to lack uniformity, resulting in
differences of application. Any lack of uniformity conflicts with ERISA’s
mandate of ease of administration. Uniformity, simplicity of application, and
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2, D-3 (2005)
(persons whom establish and maintain the framework are engaged in fiduciary acts); Donovan
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272–73 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding the fiduciary duty under ERISA is
the “highest known to the law”); see generally Langbein, supra note 1, at 1324–25.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
18. See Fabian v. Lindsay, 765 S.E.2d 132, 140 (S.C. 2014) (holding that an attorney can be
held liable for malpractice); Tamposi Assocs., Inc. v. Star Mkt. Co., 406 A.2d 132, 134 (N.H. 1979)
(holding third-parties may seek a remedy in court when the promisor had reason to know that a
benefit to a third party is contemplated by the promisee as one of the motivating causes for the
contract); see also Gerry W. Beyer, Avoid Being a Defendant: Estate Planning Malpractice and
Ethical Concerns, 5 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 224, 231–32 (2015); Stephanie B.
Casteel et al., The Modern Estate Planning Lawyer: Avoiding the Maelstrom of Malpractice
Claims, 22 PROBATE & PROP. 46, 49 (2008).
19. See Casteel et al., supra note 18, at 48.
20. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 168–69.
21. See id. at 178–81, 196, 199, 205 (discussing the issues and applications of antilapse,
elective share computations, constructive trusts, and substitute gift statutes in light of the ERISA
beneficiary designation); see also Katherine A. McAllister, A Distinction Without a Difference?
ERISA Preemption and the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-On-Divorce and
Slayer Statutes, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1488–89, 1494–95 (2011) (discussing the rise of revocationon-divorce and slayer statutes and their subsequent analogous treatment in the lower courts).
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ease of administration are terms that federal courts frequently use to preempt
application of contrary state laws, all in conformity with the United States
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.22
The federal preemption cases are both expansive and comprehensive.23 As
illustration, a progression of Supreme Court decisions document that ERISA’s
integrity relies upon the principle that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument.”24 The written
instrument is meant to be simple, containing a designated beneficiary that may
not be overridden by extraneous arguments that a designated beneficiary is
displaced as result of a divorce,25 allegation of a federal common law waiver,26
the imposition of a constructive trust,27 or because the designated beneficiary
signed a marital settlement agreement.28 Since each of these legal arguments
can be addressed differently among the states, any incorporation of state law into
plan administration jeopardizes the simplicity intended by Congress, and
therefore necessitates the federal preemption of state laws conflicting with
ERISA. In addition to the simplicity of the plan’s written instrument, there are
ample judicial holdings affirming the primacy of the plan’s designated
beneficiary rule, thereby underpinning the argument that both estate planners
and pension fund administrators are in breach of their fiduciary responsibility to

22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 181–83 (1824)
(preempting state law that conflicted with federal laws licensing companies engaged in coastal
trade).
23. ERISA excludes from preemption “any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). There is also an exemption for qualified
domestic relations orders (QDROs), which create an alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an
alternate payee the right to, receive all of or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a
particular plan. See id. §§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i), 1144(b)(7); see also State Farm Life & Accident
Assurance Co. v. Goecks, 184 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708 (W.D. Wis. 2016). Federal decisions depart
from the actual words of the federal statute and instead ask whether the state statute is an obstacle
to accomplishing the objectives of the federal statute. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and
Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2013).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
25. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (holding that
contrary state laws are preempted by the plan term’s benefit mandate); see also Hillman v. Maretta,
133 S. Ct. 1943, 1954–55 (2013) (holding state law is preempted because it conflicts with FEGLIA,
an insurance program for federal employees).
26. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 304 (2009)
(holding that any federal common law of waiver signed by a participant’s ex-spouse did not invoke
ERISA’s antialienation provision).
27. See, e.g., Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept.
3, 2015) (holding a constructive trust does not avoid the preemptive effect of ERISA); see also
Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that any constructive trust
created by a state court is preempted by ERISA).
28. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hebert, No. 14C9292, 2016 WL 6442180, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 1, 2016) (holding that because the settlement agreement did not qualify as a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO) it was preempted by ERISA’s plan designation rule).
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plan holders when failing to provide guidance to clients concerning options
pertaining to any plan’s beneficiary.29
Multiple lawsuits arise because plaintiffs are astounded when insurance or
pension benefits are paid to an individual whom the decedent is divorced, and
usually divorced for a lengthy period of time. Admittedly, the accountholder
failed to update his or her plan’s designated beneficiary form even though there
was sufficient time to do so.30 This common mistake flows from the plan
manager’s responsibility to update the intent of the accountholder.31 The
fiduciary duty of the plan manager includes providing proper forms to capture
employee intent, to make consistent periodic inquiry, to anticipate change and
the possibility of unintended consequences, and to avoid mistakes as prudently
as possible under the prevailing circumstances.32 Currently, the vast majority of
plan managers fail to provide this level of accountability.33
To illustrate the failure of fiduciary responsibility, consider divorce—the
parallel process of signing a financial settlement agreement that purportedly
disclaims any interest in the other party’s property, division of all marital
property, and any attendant support obligations. Without a valid QDRO, even
the most precise settlement agreement is insufficient to revoke an ERISAgoverned plan’s designated beneficiary.34 Even the use of a constructive trust,
which bars the former spouse from becoming “unjustly” enriched, cannot negate
the ERISA-plan’s designated beneficiary from taking the proceeds.35 Similarly,
state statutes are ineffective substitutes for attorney and plan manager initiative.
To illustrate, the general population is often familiar with revocation by
operation of law statutes which occur upon the issuance of a final decree of
divorce.36 The modern approach treats the former spouse as predeceasing the
testator for purposes of taking from the testator upon death.37 These statutes
apply to last wills and testaments and increasingly to nonprobate transfers such
as the contracts illustrated in ERISA cases.38 Therefore, in relying upon an
understanding of local statutes, common practice, or traditional common sense,
practitioners and clients may assume a last will and testament is revoked in
whole or in part upon the occurrence of a valid final decree of divorce. This

29. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1346.
30. See, e.g., Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 303–04. Two months had elapsed between divorce and
death for decedent to change the beneficiary. Id. There were eleven years between divorce and
decedent’s death to change the beneficiary, but it was not changed. See Cunningham, 2016 WL
6442180, at *4
31. See Beyer, supra note 18, at 236.
32. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 201.
33. See id. at 201–02.
34. See id. at 197–98.
35. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010).
36. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 195–96.
37. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1 (2017).
38. See id.
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error, illustrated by a plethora of federal decisions involving ERISA, FEGLIA,
and SGLIA, is discussed throughout this Article.39 These decisions highlight
the inapplicability of state statutes and the error of many plan managers and
attorney practitioners, who inattentively or negligently assume that local law
supplants Congressional mandates.
Plan managers and estate planning attorneys are familiar with the increase in
the number and use of nonprobate transfers, a transformation that concurrently
unfolded with the enactment of ERISA in 1974, and which now eclipses probate
wealth transfers.40 As a result of historical precedent, states vigilantly enacted
statutes to accommodate a testator’s intent in the context of probate, intestacy,
and last wills and testaments.41 However, the same attentiveness is not
consistently true with nonprobate transfers, insurance contracts, and pension
fund accounts within nonprobate transfers. In addition, with nonprobate devices
there exists far less uniformity among the states in reference to divorce and
revocation of designated beneficiaries through attendant operation of law
statutes.42 Adding to this diversity of state application is that many practitioners
consider ERISA’s provisions daunting and mistakenly assume ERISA pertains
only to federal law—unworthy of proper review.43 Nonetheless, assets and
employees governed by ERISA are increasing with the utilization of ERISAgoverned nonprobate benefit plans.44 This is complicated by the significant
probability of divorce among employees/accountholders.45 The unintended
consequences of fiduciary inattention to ERISA’s strict adherence to the plan’s
designated beneficiary rule is economically significant. Many former spouses
are unintended beneficiaries of ERISA type plans because they are the plans’
designated beneficiaries.46 This reality precipitated an outcry from renowned
commentators railing against federal preemption of traditional state sovereignty

39. See discussion infra Section I.A–C.
40. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1129 (1984); see generally Melanie B. Leslie & Stewart E.
Sterk, Revisiting the Revolution: Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System, 56 B.C. L. REV.
61, 63 (2015) (“For many people planning their estates, the will is now the least important document
in their estate plan.”).
41. See Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 62–63.
42. See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871,
1905–06 (2014) (describing the lack of uniformity among the states in matters of probate and
practice).
43. See id. at 1904–07.
44. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1694.
45. See Marriage and Divorce, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/topics/divorce/
(last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (“[A]bout 40 to 50 percent of married couples in the United States
divorce. The divorce rate for subsequent marriages is even higher.”).
46. See Jeff Landers, Divorcing Women—Know the Laws Affecting Your Beneficiary
Designations, FORBES (April 9, 2015, 11:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2015/0
4/09/divorcing-women-know-the-laws-affecting-your-beneficiary-designations/#685df46045ed.
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over wealth transfer at death.47 Omnipresent and ever resolute, the fact remains
that ERISA requires uniformity, clarity, and simplicity. If an accountholder
completes a beneficiary designation form, that designated beneficiary will
receive the proceeds regardless of any local law or practice. It does not appear
that federal preemption will decrease, thus furthering a continuation of
unintended consequences.
The Article discusses another option which uses ERISA’s provisions
prompting plan managers and practitioners to take a fiduciary approach to the
plan’s participants and designated beneficiaries. Decisions reveal justifications
for this approach. First, the scope of ERISA policy applying federal preemption,
specifically how ERISA relies upon uniformity of plan application and how even
the slightest variation found in state laws would impede the simplicity of that
application. Second, the federal refusal to accommodate state laws and practices
precipitates mistakes that resulting in a spate of lawsuits and judicial opinions
evidencing a pattern of relentless federal preemption. This Article discusses
ERISA’s preemptory policy and its intransigent application. First, courts are
rejecting a theory of unjust enrichment by which the plan’s designated
beneficiary restoring any payments made under the ERISA-governed plan, if the
beneficiary’s disqualification is established under the state’s revocation by
operation of law statute.48 Second, whether an ERISA-governed designated
beneficiary can waive his or her rights to the proceeds of the plan through
disclaimer—a valid settlement agreement that references the proceeds and that
was voluntarily entered into at the time of the divorce.49 Third, there may exist
a federal common law permitting federal courts to rely upon state law to permit
avoidance of the designated plan beneficiary in a manner similar to what state
courts allow. It appears such a policy already exists in reference to state slayer
statutes, however, the argument is that federal common law should be expanded
to include revocation by operation of law upon divorce.50 The issue is not that
these three arguments are unavailing but rather, they solidify ERISA’s particular
administrative goals and more deeply ensconce federal supremacy as a reality.
This reality is difficult for state practitioners to accommodate as they are
accustomed to local control over matters pertaining to domestic relations and
probate.51 Federal preemption will not abate. Indeed, as one commentator
47. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 5, at 1666 (“Egelhoff and Hillman will saddle American
wealth transfer law with needlessly contradictory federal and state rules, sometimes applicable to
different transfers by the same transferor.”); see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping
Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1662–63 (2014) (“The Supreme
Court’s Egelhoff and Hillman decisions and the Treasury regulations regarding U.S. government
securities in survivorship form have thoughtlessly and needlessly barred the unification effort for
federally authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers.”).
48. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 5, at 1678–79.
49. See, e.g., MacInnes v. MacInnes, 677 N.W.2d 889, 889–95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)
(Murphy, J., concurring).
50. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1690–93.
51. See Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1877–78.
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writes, “[a]t least within the area of trusts and estates, that giant has slumbered
for a long time, and has yet to throw his weight around in a big way, so to
speak.”52
Faced with trillions of dollars passing under ERISA plans, this Article argues
that, despite repeated appeals to the contrary, the designated beneficiary in the
ERISA plan document controls and professional practitioners of the law must be
attentive to the possibility of status changes applicable to vested or contingent
plan beneficiaries.53 As a response to this fact, it is the responsibility of both the
plan managers providing the forms and follow-up inquiry, as well as estate
planning attorneys working with clients at divorce and in planning estate plans
where there is disposition of assets managed by ERISA. Each of these groups
is responsible for providing superior plan beneficiary designation forms and,
when employed by a past, current, or future ERISA employee, to raise the issue
of status change and provide the proper advice and direction. The mechanism
for enforcing this fiduciary responsibility is through 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)’s
accommodation of appropriate equitable relief. Equity demands that plan
managers and attorneys developing plans for clients respond in a prudent fashion
or risk being held accountable for breach of fiduciary responsibility.
I.

ASSUMPTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO MISTAKES
A.

Ascendance of Nonprobate Transfers

Assumptions concerning divorce, waivers, and marital agreements are the
subject of mistake due to three significant developments. First, upon death, the
manner of testamentary wealth transfer in the United States shifted from passing
predominantly through a last will and testament, what is referred to as probate,
to more convenient, less expensive, and more prevalent nonprobate transfers
such as contracts payable at death, inter vivos trusts, and joint accounts.54
Professor Langbein provides a good summary of the evolution of wealth transfer
devices:
The older probate system of court-supervised transfer has been
increasingly displaced by a nonprobate system in which financial
intermediaries (including banks, insurers, mutual funds, and pension
plans) transfer the owner’s account balance on death. Beneficiary
designations on financial accounts tend ever more to do the work of

52. Id. at 1929.
53. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 146 (2001) (holding that
ERISA’s preemption mandates that any fiduciary administer benefits in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan).
54. Reference to this is made in the Prefatory Note to Article II, Intestacy, Wills, and Donative
Transfers, Uniform Probate Code (2014), listing it as one of the four themes prompting a systematic
review of the Code. The trend was identified in Revisiting the Revolution. Leslie & Sterk, supra
note 40, at 63; see also Langbein, supra note 40, at 1129.
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family wealth transmission that used to be done in the probate
process.55
A characteristic of nonprobate plans is that they provide for a standardized
form designation by which to identify a designated beneficiary—often a current
spouse.56 This standardization may produce unintended consequences, resulting
in a designated beneficiary taking under a nonprobate transfer’s form
designation even though this was not intended by the creator of the interest when
he or she completed the form.57 Additionally, many transfer devices,
“dramatically increased the dollar volume of assets likely to pass outside the
probate system.”58
Traditionally, there was scant reference to nonprobate transfers in any state
wealth transfer statute that involved revocation of spouses, most statute
addressed wills only.59 Gradually, states adopted revocation by operation of law
provisions applicable to nonprobate devices.60 State statutes typically provide
that once a valid final decree of divorce is rendered, the former spouse is treated
as predeceasing the testator for purposes of taking under a will, intestate, or
through nonprobate device.61 Without such state statutes, a former spouse
receives nonprobate transfers, including insurance or pension benefits, from a
decedent who, while happily married, listed the former spouse as the designated
beneficiary.62 Most often, after a final divorce decree ends the marriage, the
employee spouse neglects to change the designated beneficiary from the former
spouse to a new beneficiary—often a new spouse.63 The unintended
consequences of this are illustrated in the following facts:
55. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1694.
56. See id. at 1665.
57. See id. at 1694–96.
58. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 63.
59. See id. at 67.
60. Refer to Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, for a history of
revocation by operation of laws statutes. Susan N. Gray, Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes
to Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 83, 85–100 (2004). As an illustration of states
ignoring the impact of divorce on nonprobate transfers, note “both Illinois and New Hampshire law
provide that divorce automatically revokes provisions in both wills and revocable trusts that pertain
to exspouses. Neither, however, extends this rule to beneficiary designations in contracts, such as
life insurance, IRAs or POD provisions.” Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 67 (citing 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/4-7(b) (2012); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2-6(b); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 (2012);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(II) (2007)) (footnotes omitted).
61. Gray, supra note 60, at 84.
62. See Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 67.
63. See Leslie A. Shaner, When Clients Fail to Change Beneficiary Designations, FAMILY
LAW. MAG. (Sept. 8, 2016), http://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/beneficiary-designations/
(“The most common situation is that a deceased ex-spouse has failed to change the beneficiary
designation/survivorship election for a nonprobate asset to either his/her new spouse or to anyone
else, e.g., the parties’ children; and, the living ex-spouse remains as the designated beneficiary on
the nonprobate asset.”); see also Mary Ellen Signorille et al., Current Challenges and Best
Practices Concerning Beneficiary Designations in Retirement and Life Insurance Plans, DEP’T OF
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[S]uppose that soon after her marriage, a testator executes a will
naming her husband as her beneficiary. Thereafter, she accumulates
a mutual fund account, and, as part of her employee-benefits package,
a 401K and a life insurance policy. She names her husband as the
death beneficiary of all the nonprobate assets. After the testator and
her husband go through an acrimonious divorce, the testator dies
unexpectedly before engaging in any post-divorce estate planning.
Will the ex-husband be entitled to any of the testator’s assets?
If the testator were domiciled in a state with a modern revocation-on-divorce
statute, the ex-husband would not be entitled to any of the testator’s probate
assets or the proceeds of the mutual fund account. Due to the ERISA preemption
rule, he would collect the proceeds of the employer-provided retirement account
and life insurance policy. 64
Gradually, modern state statutes, prompted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), included nonprobate
transfer devices within their state revocation by operation of law statutes.65
These statutes still varied among the states, but most treated a former spouse—
and sometimes his or her relatives—as predeceasing the policy-holder and
thereby excluded from taking as a beneficiary under a last will and testament, as
well as under nonprobate transfer devices.66 Unfortunately, these uniform laws
are not uniform among the states, “[u]nlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Uniform Probate Code and related products have never gained anything close to
universal adoption, but they did succeed in stirring things up, encouraging more
states to codify and to reexamine and fiddle with statutes already in place.”67
While most state statutes treat a divorced spouse as deceased when probating the
last will and testament of the other spouse, what occurs when that divorced
spouse is listed as a designated beneficiary of nonprobate assets remains less
than uniform in application.
All ERISA, FEGLIA, and SGLIA plans offer designated beneficiaries, a form
of nonprobate device often not addressed in state revocation by operation of law

LABOR 3 (Dec. 2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisaadvisory-council/2012-current-challenges-and-best-practices-concerning-beneficiarydesignations-in-retirement-and-life-insurance-plans.pdf (reporting that “[t]he most common and
frequently contentious disputes occur where participants marry or divorce but fail to update their
beneficiary designations to reflect this change of status before their death”).
64. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 68.
65. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 cmt. (amended 2010).
66. See, e.g., id. § 2-804(d) (“Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if the
former spouse and relatives of the former spouse disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section
or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the former
spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or annulment.”).
See also Gray, supra note 60, at 100–02.
67. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1905.
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statutes.68 Thus, to hold state statutes applicable to these federal plans involves
the administration of the plan under different state laws. Such a result is
anathema to the ease of administration mandated by Congress. Regardless what
the state revocation by operation of law statute provides, Congress, in enacting
ERISA, “had an implicit interest in ensuring that ‘the insurance proceeds will be
paid to the named beneficiary and that the beneficiary can use them.’”69
Neither the prevalence of nonprobate devices nor the increasing amount of
dollars under management will abate. Congress is not incentivized to amend
federal legislation to permit revocation by operation of law similar to what is
done in the States.
Understandably, Congress is willing to permit
employees/accountholders to make the decisions necessary to change the
designation.70 Replacing one beneficiary with another is a simple matter. The
responsibility lies with plan managers to offer the option of revocation by
operation of law on the form at the time of employment.71 Furthermore, there
exists a duty on plan managers to make inquiry of the employees afterward, to
better identify the intent of the employee and to incentivize the employee to
make the change.72 This is prudent when planning for the needs of the
participants and beneficiaries.
Wealth transfer shifted toward nonprobate transfers and a corresponding
accommodation by plan managers is therefore, appropriate. This shift is similar
to what occurred with spousal equality law which began in the 1970s, providing
equality of ownership and management of marital property.73 Estate planners
and Congressional action developed and implemented procedures by which this
shift was accommodated, by enacting provisions accommodating state
QDROs.74 Today, plan managers must accommodate the high incidence of
68. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1835, 1852 (2014).
69. See id. at 1852 (citing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953 (2013)). ERISA applies
to pension plans such as 401(k) plans, welfare plans including life insurance, medical and disability
insurance, education programs, child care, and severance. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)–(2); see
also JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 175–218
(3d ed. 2000).
70. See Rosenbury, supra note 68, at 1852; see also Mary Ellen Signorille et al., supra note
63, at 3.
71. See Avci et. al., supra note 2, at 354.
72. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502–03 (1996) (“ERISA itself specifically
requires administrators to give beneficiaries certain information about the plan . . . . And
administrators, as part of their administrative responsibilities, frequently offer beneficiaries more
than the minimum information that the statute requires-for example, answering beneficiaries’
questions about the meaning of the terms of a plan so that those beneficiaries can more easily obtain
the plan’s benefits. To offer beneficiaries detailed plan information in order to help them decide
whether to remain with the plan is essentially the same kind of plan-related activity.”) (citations
omitted).
73. See Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share,
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 620–23 (2010).
74. See id. at 688.
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divorce, the mistakes that employees/accountholders make when they fail to
update plan beneficiary forms, and that the major estate asset is the ERISA
pension fund or insurance policy. To date, few plan managers present clients
with comprehensive plan forms, or fail to make inquiry to update designated
beneficiaries.75 Enforcing equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) will
prompt better forms and inquiry.
B.

Equality of Spouses

During the period that nonprobate transfers became increasingly prevalent,
the perspective of family law, particularly marriage but also custody and support
obligations, shifted from a male-dominated focus to a characterization of the
relationship as one of shared economic partnership between two equal
partners.76 Gradually, spouses were, through statute and common law,
increasingly considered as co-owners of property acquired during the marital or
community period.77 Even though one spouse might work only in the home,
both spouses are now deemed equal owners of wealth acquired during the course
of the marriage.78 This process of equalization proceeded at the federal and state
levels. Illustrative of this equality of ownership was the enactment of ERISA,79
although ERISA’s primary goal was to provide security of retirement for
employees. Nonetheless, later legislation ensured that spouses are preferred
beneficiaries at death, subject to displacement only with consent.80 ERISA was
signed into law on Labor Day of 1974, designed to protect the pension benefits
of workers and to safeguard the rights of the workers’ beneficiaries properly
designated on the pension benefit forms.81 Ten years later, the Retirement
75. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 224, 228–30.
76. See O’Brien, supra note 73, at 620–23.
77. Id.
78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2016). Specifically, the California code reads:
Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in
open court, or as otherwise provided in this division, in a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the court shall, either in its judgement of
dissolution of the marriage, in its judgement of legal separation of the parties, or at a later
time if it is expressly reserves jurisdiction to makes such a property division, divide the
community estate of the parties equally.
Id. Equality of spouses was intended to apply at death, not just at divorce, as is illustrated in the
Uniform Probate Code elective share provision. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt.
(“The revision of this section is the first step in the overall plan of implementing a partnership or
marital-sharing theory of marriage.”).
79. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)); see generally PAUL J.
SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHERO, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 1.03 (3d ed. 2008). For
an explanation of how the enactment of ERISA made defined-benefit plans less attractive to
employers, refer to Accidental Inheritance. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 170–75.
80. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
81. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997). Two other federal statutes likewise
protect any beneficiary named in the plan documents. See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943,
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Equity Act of 1984 (REA) was enacted.82 The REA strengthened the rights of
a surviving spouse by providing the surviving spouse with an income stream
after a worker’s death. The REA’s preface provides that the new legislation is
meant to:
[I]mprove the delivery of retirement benefits and provide for greater
equity under private pension plans for workers and their spouses and
dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns, the status
of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial
contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in and
outside the home, and for other purposes.83
Equality of spouses is recognized in the two legislative acts, but “ERISA
provides that at the accountholder’s death, the accountholder’s surviving spouse
(if any) shall be the beneficiary of any remaining assets, unless the spouse has
properly waived that right.”84 Of further note, “[d]epending on the
circumstances, a surviving spouse has a right to a survivor’s annuity or to a
lump-sum payment on the death of the participant, unless . . . the participant has
eliminated the survivor annuity benefit or designated a different beneficiary.”85
To minimize interference from states with conflicting goals and policies, ERISA
specifically preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”86 By enacting the preemption
1947–55 (2013) (discussing Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA)) and
Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163, at *5–6 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2015)
(discussing the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA)).
82. See generally Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. The
REA modified the rules to allow for a surviving spouse to receive benefits when he or she is either
married for at least one year prior to the participant’s retirement, see 29 U.S.C. § 1055(f)(1) (2012),
or if married to the participant—but must be married to the participant at least one year prior to his
or her death, see § 1055(f)(2).
83. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426. The Act provided
three enhancements to ERISA’s protection of spouses of accountholders: (1) more pension plans
were covered; (2) pension plans were required to name spouses as beneficiaries of specified
survivorship benefits; and (3) any change in such statutory designations requires the written consent
of the accountholder’s spouse. Id. § 103, § 203, § 207.
84. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 172–73 (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11)–(13) (2006));
see generally DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 24–26
(2010).
85. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 293–94 (2009) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 1055(a), (b)(1)(C), (c)(2) and Boggs, 520 U.S. at 843).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016)
(discussing the scope of ERISA’s preemption). But see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (stating ERISA
excludes from preemption any law of any state that regulates insurance, banking, or securities).
There is also an exception for qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs), which create or
recognize the existence of an alternate payee’s right to, or assignment to an alternate payee the right
to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under the retirement
plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(7), 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); see also State Farm Life & Accident
Assurance Co. v. Goecks, 184 F. Supp. 3d 701, 703 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (holding the designated
beneficiary must take policy proceeds unless there is a valid QDRO).
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provision, Congress wanted to ensure that plans and plan sponsors are subject to
a uniform body of benefit law, the goal being to minimize administrative and
financial burdens associated with complying with conflicting state directives, or
between states and the federal government.87
C. Federal Preemption of State Laws
ERISA and preemption of state laws illustrate another significant
development in the law of wealth transfer: the gradual but relentless inroads
made by federal law into an area historically dominated by state legislation.88
Commentators suggest that federal preemption may continue unabated.
Professor Adam J. Hirsch observes that: “[a]t least within the arena of trusts and
estates, that giant has slumbered for a long time, and he has yet to throw his
weight around in a big way, so to speak.”89 So too, Professor Lawrence W.
Waggoner, a Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers, the Uniform Probate Code, and the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities, writes that:
Because of the raw power granted to the federal government by the
Constitution, federal law is the elephant in the room, even in a
traditional state-law sphere as wealth transfer law. It is distressing
indeed that those who produce that elephant often—not always, but
often—seem oblivious to the damage they can do and have done to
well-considered state law.90
Traditionally, state courts and state legislatures were the arbiters of both
family law and intergenerational wealth transfers. In 1858, the Supreme Court
decision of Barber v. Barber91 established the federal exception to domestic
relations jurisdiction. The exception developed to mean that state courts decide
matters of divorce, child custody, and visitation.92 There are of course
exceptions, most illustrative are when Congress enacts laws pertaining to

87. See Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992).
88. See Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1637.
89. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1929.
90. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1663 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.” (referencing the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution Article
VI)).
91. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858) (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in
the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either
as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and
board.”). In 1992, Justice White based the domestic relations exception in the power of Congress
to grant jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689, 697 (1992).
92. See id. at 700–07.
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domestic violence or child kidnapping and abduction.93 Ostensibly, there
remains a federal exception to domestic relations jurisdiction. This policy is
referenced in the 1982 Supreme Court decision of Santosky v. Kramer.94 Justice
Rehnquist wrote that domestic relations “has been left to the States from time
immemorial, and not without good reason.”95 Since ERISA’s employment
perspective is national, so are an increasing number of domestic relations
matters, some involving international consequences, and Congress is reluctant
to enact federal legislation forcing states to accommodate their own laws.96
Similarly, in reference to intergenerational wealth transfers, state statutes and
judicial opinions historically provided the mechanism by which wealth was
transferred from one generation to the next through intestacy, last wills and
testaments, and now nonprobate transfer.97 While there is no history of judicial
opinions carving out a “wealth transfer exception” to federal jurisdiction, state
sovereignty assumed authority because of English precedent and the practical
observation that localities are better suited to gauge any inexpertly expressed
intent of the locals.98 A noted teacher and author, Professor Thomas E.
Atkinson, captured both the genesis and the rationale behind local control of
wealth transfer when observing that, “[c]ourts of probate are close to the people;
one can be found in every county, and in Connecticut at practically every
crossroad.”99 States consistently assumed the role of probate, perhaps because
the wealth of decedents was local wealth, thus localities are better suited to
estimating the intentionalities of their constituents.100 State intestate law is a
good illustration of this process. Each state enacted statutes based on what was
perceived to be the decedent’s intent. Then, the intestate statute distributes any
of the decedent’s property that does not pass under a valid will or nonprobate
device. Unsurprisingly, intestate statutes vary widely among the States.

93. See id. (discussing the progression of the exceptions).
94. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–70 (1982).
95. Id. at 770 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. One example was Congress’s enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000), to address interstate custody jurisdiction problems. By
enacting PKPA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was forced to
revise its Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to accommodate the federal basis of jurisdiction,
enacting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act of 1997. See William J.
Howe & Hugh McIsaac, Finding the Balance: Ethical Challenges and Best Practices for Lawyers
Representing Parents When the Interests of Children Are at Stake, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 78, 80 (2008).
97. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and Unanticipated
Circumstances, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1931, 1931–32 (2014).
98. Id. at 1933–35.
99. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 29 (1953).
100. See id.
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Commentators debate whether the intentionality of the decedent was captured
correctly, and consensus as to intentionalities is rare.101 The decedent was
always able to provide for other intended beneficiaries. Overall:
[M]uch of state wealth transfer law was either created to, or does in
fact, effectuate donative intent by filling gaps created by the donor’s
inability to predict future events. Other examples include the trust law
modification doctrines; powers of appointment; the repose of
discretion in a trustee; doctrines of ademption, accession, satisfaction,
and abatement; rules governing pretermitted spouses and children; the
requirement of testamentary capacity; and the slayer rule.102
It is understandable that federal preemption of established wealth transfer
procedure in each of the states causes commentators, attorneys, and state
legislators to strenuously object. For example, a few members of the Supreme
Court raise concern over the literal interpretation given to the ERISA’s
preemption clause.103
There are multiple arguments suggesting that federal preemption is
unwarranted. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joined, wrote a blanket
preemption interpretation will produce an “avalanche of litigation,” threatening
results that Congress could not foresee.104 Instead, their approach being to
“‘respect’ the ‘separate sphere[e]’ of state ‘authority’”105 and where “the state
statute before us is one regarding family property—a ‘fiel[d] of traditional state
regulation,’ where the interpretative presumption against pre-emption is
particularly strong.”106 Similarly, Justice Thomas urges restraint when applying
preemption of state laws, “[u]ntil we confront whether Congress had the
constitutional authority to pre-empt such a wide array of state laws in the first
place, the Court—and lower courts—will continue to struggle to apply § 1144
[preemption].”107 Justice Thomas also wrote, “[p]re-emption analysis should,
therefore, instead hew closely to the text and structure of the provisions at issue,
and a court should find pre-emption only when the ‘ordinary meaning’ of duly
enacted federal law ‘effectively repeal[s] contrary state law.”108
In an effort to reduce preemption, some justices suggest that federal
preemption may be drifting into unconstitutionality,109 others argue for
enforcement of a presumption against preemption.110 Still, others question
101. See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and
Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 57–58 (2009).
102. Weisbord, supra note 97, at 1934–35.
103. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 153–54 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 153–54.
105. Id. at 160.
106. Id. at 163.
107. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 949 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
108. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1955 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
109. See, eg., Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 949 (Thomas, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 954 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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whether any state law presents an impermissible connection with an ERISA
plan.111 Professors Sterk and Leslie offer the following insight:
Other instruments reflecting the accountholder’s intent, including
wills, revocable trust instruments, and the terms of divorce decrees,
count little in the face of the accountholder’s failure to change the
beneficiary designation form he or she filled out years earlier. Major
life events, such as marriage, the birth of new family members, and
the death of others, have little or no effect on distribution of the
account unless the accountholder had the presence of mind to change
the beneficiary designation.112
Increasingly, cases evidence a willingness to preempt state laws, mostly
because of what Justice Breyer characterizes as “serious administrative
problems.”113 Justice Breyer explains that “[i]f each State is free to go its own
way, each independently determining what information each plan must provide
about benefits, the result could well be unnecessary, duplicative, and conflicting
reporting requirements, any of which can mean increased confusion and
increased cost.”114
The rationale underlying preemption is ease of
administration of an array of ERISA accounts. Justice Kennedy, writing in
Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., summarized the rationale for federal
preemption concluding that, “Pre-emption is necessary in order to prevent
multiple jurisdictions from imposing differing, or even parallel, regulations,
creating wasteful administrative costs and threatening to subject plans to wideranging liability.”115 Even if state law traditionally regulated fields, such as
domestic relations, ERISA’s preemption still applies because Congress
“certainly contemplated the pre-emption of substantial areas of traditional state
regulation.”116
Justice Thomas defers to the historical status of state sovereignty, and noted
commentators such as Professor John Langbein, while admitting that “under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the power to forbid the

111. Id. (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 668 (1995)).
112. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 201, 207 (adding also that “[f]orms that lead the
accountholder to name a spouse as the primary beneficiary of an ERISA-governed account present
the most egregious example of how designation forms take too little account of potential life
changes”).
113. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (holding Congress intended for ERISA to provide a uniform
set of administrative procedures).
114. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 949.
115. Id. at 939; see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (holding that Congress
sought to avoid complexity and administration costs because these would discourage employers
from adopting the benefit plans).
116. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 946 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham
Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 330 (1997)).
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application of state wealth transfer law to a federally authorized account,”117 this
power should not be inferred from silence.118 Professor Langbein suggests that
something more is needed in the text of the federal statute to permit preemption,
“[t]he inference that should have been drawn from ERISA’s silence on these
matters is that Congress did not intend to displace such state laws, especially in
view of the ‘presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state
regulations such as family law.’”119 Additionally, commentators argue that
matters traditionally left to the states, such as family law and wealth transfer,
should be particularly insulated from federal preemption.120 Professor Langbein
argues the Court long deferred to state domestic relations law, a deference
recognized by Congress121 with codified enforcement of state marital property
decrees through QDROs:122
Accordingly, the divorce revocation problem . . . did not come into
discussion and was not addressed in [the federal] legislation, but the
principle embodied in the QDRO regime—deference to state law on
marital property matters incident to divorce—invited extension to
state divorce revocation statutes, contrary to the Court’s decision [on
preemption].123
Professor Langbein argues the Court demonstrates “mistaken assumptions”
and “unfamiliarity” with basic principles of trust law, suggesting instead that
states are better informed as to wealth transfer law.124 Furthermore, Professor
Langbein argues that revocation by operation of law occasioned by divorce “is
an issue about which federal law provides no direction and expresses no federal
interest.”125 Instead, by “preventing state law from doing its customary work of
interpreting the meaning of beneficiary designations, federal preemption
needlessly defeats the core policy of wealth transfer law, to implement the
transferor’s intent.”126

117. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1671.
118. Id. at 1674.
119. Id. at 1676 (referencing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001)).
120. Id.
121. Id. (referencing De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) as support for the
proposition that there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state
concern).
122. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1676 (referencing the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L.
98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984)).
123. Id. at 1677.
124. Id. at 1695–96 (referencing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1957 (2013) (Alito, J.,
concurring)). Specifically, Langbein writes: “The Court’s disinterest in the purpose of the divorce
revocation rule also meant that the Court had no understanding of the magnitude of the harm that
the preemption rule would cause.” Id. at 1696.
125. Id. at 1677.
126. Id. (referencing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003)).
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Professor Lawrence Waggoner, another legal commentator with notable
credentials in the area of decedents’ estates laments the Court’s departure from
the “intent-effecting divorce-revocation rule for federally authorized or
regulated nonprobate payments” and for the Court’s unawareness of the
“decades-long movement toward unifying the law of probate and non-probate
transfers.”127 Professor Waggoner, a Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code, is
not only concerned about federal preemption of state divorce revocation by
operation of law statutes, but that federal preemption erodes state advances that
permit including nonprobate transfers in what is termed the “augmented estate”
of a decedent spouse.128 Additionally, because federal preemption demands that
the plan beneficiary designation controls, “neither a subsequent marriage, the
birth of a child, a divorce, nor the death of a beneficiary can affect the beneficiary
designation. Any applicable omitted-spouse, omitted-child, or antilapse
statutes, as well as state statutes that revoke beneficiary designations on divorce,
are preempted by ERISA.”129 The scope of federal preemption is undetermined,
but presently Professor Waggoner views it as a direct threat to utilization of
augmented estate.
The augmented estate is increasingly utilized among the States as a statutory
mechanism to include nonprobate transfers within the estate of a decedent
spouse, permitting his or her surviving spouse to claim a portion of nonprobate
transfers when a third party is named as the beneficiary and where a disappointed
spouse seeks a portion.130 Currently, “[a]bout thirty-seven percent of the noncommunity property states . . . extend their elective-share laws to nonprobate
transfers.”131 In effect, by augmenting the estate, a surviving spouse is able “to
elect” a portion of the marital estate that includes any transfer termed
nonprobate, such as joint bank accounts, multiple party accounts, pay on death
and transfer on death accounts, joint tenancy in real estate, life insurance,
revocable trusts, and pension retirement contracts, annuities with a death benefit,
Totten trusts, and any account with a right of survivorship.132 Since the majority
of wealth transfers outside of probate,133 augmented estate provides a surviving
spouse with a significant tool for recapturing marital property after the death of
the spouse holding title.
Professor Waggoner is concerned the states permitting use of augmented
estate may see the practice preempted by federal courts. He suggests that
127. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1642.
128. Id. at 1643.
129. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 186.
130. See O’Brien, supra note 73, at 715–17.
131. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1643. For a complete discussion of augmented estate and its
evolution, refer to Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share. See generally
O’Brien, supra note 73.
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).
133. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1638.
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ERISA, amended by the REA, extends federal protection to the surviving spouse
of an employee spouse’s ERISA-covered pension plan.134 Nonetheless, the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 does not apply to federal life insurance policies,
protected under FEGLIA, nor does it apply to the National Service Life
Insurance Act of 1940, or to SGLIA.135 FEGLIA and SGLIA may preempt any
conflicting state statute such as one mandating that a surviving spouse’s right to
include insurance within a spouse’s augmented estate for election purposes. As
such, Professor Waggoner concludes that “except for ERISA-covered plans, a
decedent’s surviving spouse has no protection with respect to federal statutes
authorizing or regulating nonprobate transfers.”136 Relying on federal
preemption, and in direct contravention to state augmented estate statutes,
“[s]pouses who want to disinherit their surviving spouses need only convert as
much of their liquid wealth as possible to U.S. government securities in
survivorship form with third-party donees, so that as little as possible remains
for their surviving spouses.”137 In other words, because federal preemption
applies to FEGLIA and SGLIA, state augmented estate statutes are powerless to
reach assets held in any policy governed by these federal programs. Federal
preemption bars them from inclusion in the augmented estate.
Commentators argue that federal preemption of state law should only occur
when Congress specifically provided for such,138 but as the nation becomes less
local, there must arise some instances when national policy is justified.
Admittedly, some argue the “federalization of wealth transfer law creates
potential for harmful disruptions to settled and well-considered substantive state
law policies governing inheritance, property succession, and wealth transfer.”139
Nonetheless, an argument may be made in favor of federal preemption because
federal rules, “formulated and applied uniformly throughout the United States
by Congress and federal courts, can afford citizens a number of benefits.”140
Among the benefits are fewer expenses associated with different rules and
information costs, promotion of uniformity, minimizing uncertainty stemming
from conflicts of law, and “a centralized legal system has the capacity to fill gaps
in the law more rapidly than a decentralized one, again mitigating

134. Id. at 1643–44.
135. Id. at 1644. Professor Waggoner describes the application of the insurance programs with
corresponding preemption issues. See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2013); Ridgeway
v. Ridgeway, 454 U.S. 46, 60 (1981) (involving the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of
1965); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 660–61 (1950) (involving the National Service Life
Insurance Act of 1940).
136. Waggoner, supra note 47, at 1644.
137. Id. at 1645 (citing Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (holding contrary state law is
preempted) and In re Estate of Scheiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921–22 (Sur. Ct. 1988) (holding federal
law preempts the elective share of the surviving spouse)).
138. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 5, at 1676–77.
139. Weisbord, supra note 97, at 1944.
140. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1874.
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uncertainty.”141 Plus, there is a consensus that uniformity provides ease of
administration, an argument discussed in regards to ERISA’s policy
underpinnings.
There is one last argument in support of state law application and resistance
of the uniformity provided by federal preemption. Commentators long
associated with the development of state regulation of probate or similar
developments in family law share Professor Waggoner’s concern over the allencompassing impact of federal law on state laws and procedures developed
over centuries.142 The spate of cases involving state revocation by operation of
law statutes is only one instance of the conflict.143 State laws are better equipped
to capture the intent of an employee/accountholder, now divorced and deceased,
but having amassed assets to be distributed to those intended. Presumptively,
the divorced accountholder did not intend for the surviving plan designated
beneficiary to receive the plan’s proceeds; since the employee was divorced for
some time. The accountholder intended to change the beneficiary but neglected
to do so. It was a mistake not to change the beneficiary on the plan.
Presumptively, the plan manager who provided the plan designation form to the
employee at the commencement of employment knew that ERISA required the
designated beneficiary to receive the proceeds, but the manager did not provide
a form accommodating divorce or any other change in the accountholder’s life.
Likewise, the decedent’s attorney who facilitated the divorce or prepared
decedent’s estate plan, was presumptively aware of state revocation by operation
of law statutes, but did not advise the client of the need to change the beneficiary
designation when representing the accountholder at the divorce, or to prompt a
change to the estate plan. Perhaps the attorney thought that the state’s revocation
by operation of law statute would apply, or alternatively, that the couple’s
divorce decree incorporating a waiver of outstanding financial interest derived
from the other party, voided the designation. Both assumptions are a mistake.
Arguably, the decedent made a mistake because of neglect, but at what point
should plan managers or the accountholder’s divorce or estate planning attorney
be held responsible for negligently failing to prudently advise the client. “The
burgeoning case law suggests that far too few lawyers understand the intricacies
of estate planning with respect to retirement-plan assets.”144 Mistakes are
common to all people, one White House report concludes many individuals “do
not understand the most fundamental concepts and terminology in investing . . .
most Americans lack the requisite knowledge to protect them from outright

141. Id. at 1874–75.
142. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 60, at 126 (suggesting that federal law, including ERISA,
should defer to state law on wealth transfer); Langbein, supra note 5, at 1694–96; Rosenbury, supra
note 68, at 1869 (commenting that understandings of family formation and exit are becoming
increasingly federalized).
143. Gray, supra note 60, at 100–09.
144. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 211.
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financial fraud.”145 There is growing evidence of increased concern over
breaches of fiduciary duty by plan managers—financial breach being the most
common allegation:
For example, pension plan beneficiaries have filed several lawsuits
accusing fiduciary-executives of breaching their fiduciary duty by
failing to sell the company stock held by their pension plans before the
stock price dropped. Critics have pointed to evidence of sub-optimal
diversification: more than twenty-seven percent of all employees hold
at least half of their 401(k) balances in company stock and nearly
seven percent have their entire account in company stock. In response
to the concern that fiduciary-executives may not always act in the
interest of the fund beneficiaries, some corporations have hired
independent fiduciaries to handle the trading of company stock in their
own employee pension funds.146
Very recently, greater fiduciary accountability was invigorated through the
Department of Labor’s enforcement of a new rule under which brokers and
investment advisers for defined contribution plans, the ERISA model, are to be
subjected to higher fiduciary standards.147 Furthermore, investment advisers are
required to recommend investment products with the “best interest” of the
beneficiaries in mind.148 Logically, greater focus must evolve to encompass the
fiduciary responsibility of plan managers to provide employees with adequate
forms to capture life changes. Additionally, plan managers should be required
to make inquiry of employees so as to accommodate the employee’s intent as
life events unfold. The issue is whether the plan manager fiduciary duty
encompasses providing the accountholder with a form that accommodates his or
her intent throughout changing life circumstances. Under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3), ERISA provides such a duty.
II. ERISA POLICY PRECIPITATING PREEMPTION
A.

ERISA Policy

Employers often provide their employee with retirement accounts, now taking
the form of defined-contribution plans, as opposed to defined-benefit plans.149
Defined contribution plans grew in popularity because they provide financial
incentives to employees to plan for retirement savings with a safe and efficient
program to which the employer often contributes funds.150 For employers, the
145. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 350.
146. Id. at 365–66.
147. Id. at 340–41.
148. See, e.g., Lisa Beilfuss, How the Fiduciary-Rule Review is Likely to Play Out, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-fiduciaryrulereview-is-likely-to-play-out1486660677.
149. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 349.
150. Id. at 348.
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plans are part of a motivation program that entices new employees; they are easy
to join, and they provide a mechanism to promote savings among employees.151
The success of the program is illustrated in a comment by Justice Breyer,
concurring in one Supreme Court decision, citing an amicus brief submitted by
the American Benefits Council reporting that “ERISA-based health plans
provide benefits to 93 million Americans,”152 a significant portion of the
working population.
Before ERISA’s defined contribution plans, many participants or their
beneficiaries who qualified for pension or welfare benefits were denied their
promised benefits even though they dutifully paid into them.153 Companies
declared bankruptcy or simply defrauded employees because participants were
not informed of plan terms or there were issues with the solvency of the plan
itself.154 Public inquiries ensued and government committees formulated a plan
to guarantee employees benefits.155 By 1974, federal policy, and hence ERISA,
viewed retirement accounts as beneficial to the nation and Congress concluded
“[that it was] desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and
to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure
be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation,
and administration of such [ERISA] plans.”156 This came about because:
ERISA required the employer to deposit contributions into a common
fund and to pay retirement benefits from the fund as they matured to
individual employees. The payout amount must be described in the
plan documents and usually take the form of an annuity for employee’s
life, the joint lives of the employee and a beneficiary, a specified term,
or some variation of the three.157
The plans are designated as 401(k) or 403(b) accounts, which are governed by
ERISA.158
151. Despite the availability of these plans, fifty-six percent of Americans hold less than ten
thousand dollars in their retirement accounts, and one in three Americans hold no reported
retirement savings. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 338–39 (citing Elyssa Kirkham, 1 in 3 Americans
Have Saved $0 for Retirement, TIME (March 14, 2016), http://time.com/money/4258451/retire
ment-savings-survey/).
152. Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 949 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring).
153. Albert Feuer, Who is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA Plans?, 40 JOHN
MARSHALL L. REV. 919, 923 (2007).
154. Id. at 923 (citing EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION
XCIV-XCV (2000)).
155. See id.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
157. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 172; see also DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 5–7 (2010); JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 271 (2004); Stephen F. Befort, The
Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions,
and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 953 (2007).
158. These plans allow both employees and employers to make tax-deferred contributions—
defined contributions—into retirement savings accounts administered by the employer. See Sterk
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Overall, ERISA produced a number of revolutionary innovations: (1) The
fiduciary burden was shifted to employees because they made investment
decisions related to goals, by holding more of the employer’s stock than
otherwise permitted; (2) Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were permitted,
allowing employees to roll over their portfolios after an employment change or
retirement; and (3) rollovers prompted a significant increase in assets held in
IRAs, so that by the end of 2015 IRA assets totaled $7.3 trillion.159
ERISA was enacted to provide all Americans with assistance in planning for
a financially secure retirement. To bolster this goal, and to provide uniformity
and ease of administration, Congress mandated that ERISA “supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.”160 Preemption of conflicting state laws is necessary because such conflict
“interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.”161 While some
employers are exempted from participation, ERISA covered the vast majority of
the country’s employees. For example, government employment plans are not
covered,162 church plans are exempt unless they choose to be covered,163 and
businesses where the only employees are the owner and the owner’s spouse are
exempt.164 Every ERISA plan must be established and maintained pursuant to
a written instrument that is easy to understand,165 and the plan must establish the
manner of conducting payment—referencing the plan’s designated
beneficiary.166 Vesting of benefits occurs early due to the accrual of benefits

& Leslie, supra note 2, at 172 (citing Harvey B. Wallace II, Retirement Benefits Planning Update,
20 PROB. & PROP. 59 (2006)). A 401(k) plan is an employer-sponsored, defined-contribution plan
that permits all employees the option to save for retirement as a deduction from their paycheck
prior to taxation. See § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, authorizing tax deferral for an
employee’s contribution to a plan meeting a nondiscrimination test. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012).
As of 2017, the maximum pre-tax contribution is $18,000. IRS Announces 2017 Pension Plan
Limitations; 401(k) Contribution Limit Remains Unchanges at $18,000 for 2017, IRS (Oct. 27,
2016),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-announces-2017-pension-plan-limitations-401kcontribution-limit-remains-unchanged-at-18000-for-2017. 403(b) plans are available to employees
of certain tax exempt institutions such as public schools. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 348.
159. Id. at 349, 383 (“A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study has found that
there are more than 300 taxpayers who own IRA accounts with an aggregate value of about $81
billion. Thus, the average balance in these accounts is over $250 million each.”).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
161. Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 950 (2016) (Breyer J., concurring)
(citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
163. Id. § 1003(b)(2).
164. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b)–(c) (2017).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
166. Id. § 1102(b)(4). All plans must comply with the Plan Terms Benefit Mandate. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(D). See also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (holding a core feature of ERISA is the Plan
Terms Benefit Mandate).
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early in employment,167 and there is a spendthrift provision forbidding
assignment or alienation of benefits before payments stipulated by the plan.168
“At the end of 2015, U.S. defined contribution plan assets alone totaled $6.7
trillion,”169 rising from $104 billion in 1978.170 Federal involvement in these
plans is extensive too. For the period 2014 through 2018, the estimated foregone
federal tax revenue resulting from these plans is $785.1 billion for health and
long-term care insurance plans, and an additional $700 billion for pension
plans.171 On a personal level but with national implications, ERISA prompted
increased savings for retirement when, “[u]nless the retirement savings and
investments were managed competently, most Americans could end up in their
old age with little savings and at the mercy of various social safety net programs,
such as Social Security or Medicaid, which are only meant to be supplementary
retirement vehicles.”172
Nonetheless, increasing participation by employees does not guarantee
investments will provide for maximum return, or even that they will match
market returns. Data suggests that “[r]eturns from insider trades of pension
funds in which conflict of interest are likely to be present underperform the
market by more than 5.5% over a year.”173 In a comparison with defined-benefit
plans, which preceded ERISA defined-contribution plans, three commentators
from the University of Michigan School of Business document that:
Evidence shows that defined benefit plans significantly outperform
defined contribution plans. By design, defined benefit plans handle
inflation risk by computing benefits as a fraction of the beneficiaries’
salaries during the last few years of their working years. In contrast,
in defined contribution plans the employees are expected to make
financial decisions that help protect against inflation risk. In one
study, defined benefit plans outperformed defined contribution plans
by 76 basis points annually between 1995 and 2011. Another study
found that defined benefit plans outperformed defined contribution
plans during 1990-2012 by about 70 points annually. Given that there
was over $6.7 trillion invested in defined contribution plan accounts
alone in 2015, underperformance of 70 basis points implies a cost of

167. 29 U.S.C. § 1054. An employee’s benefits may not be forfeited because of any company
policy. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1081–86.
168. Id. §§ 1053(a)(E), 1104(a)(1)(D).
169. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 339 (citing 2016 Investment Company Fact Book, INV. CO.
INST. 136 (2016), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2016_factbook.pdf.)
170. Id. at 349.
171. Colleen E. Medill, Regulating ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA L. REV. 505, 511
(2017) (citing Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014–2018, JOINT COMM.
ON TAX’N 31–32 (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=466
3.)
172. Avci et al., supra note 2, at 348.
173. Id. at 343.
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about $50 billion per year. Once again, the lagging performance of the
defined contribution plan adds an additional burden on the American
worker to increase her future contributions as well as to take higher
levels of risk.174
The forms offered to employees by plan managers at the start of employment
vary among employers. The form is of particular significance to any discussion
of federal preemption because of ERISA’s prohibition on accountholders
changing a beneficiary designation in any manner other than through the
accountholder executing a change in beneficiary form.175 The forms are
typically prepared with little assistance from professionals chosen by the
employee and are almost always executed at the start of a new job when the
employee is young, many years away from retirement, death, birth of a child, or
divorce.176 One author describes the usual process of executing the forms:
Imagine reporting for your first day of work at a new job. You sit
down with the company’s human resources manager to complete a
two-inch-tall stack of paperwork. After 30 minutes, you reach the
bottom of the stack, which consists of a packet labeled “Your
Benefits.” The human resources manager stands up and says,
“Congratulations, you are now officially employed here. I’ll show you
to your office.” Surprised, you respond, “But wait, aren’t we going to
go through my company benefits?” “No,” responds the human
resources manager, “the company takes no responsibility whatsoever
for your retirement and healthcare benefits. You’ll have to call the
800 number inside the packet and they will assist you.177
Another author notes:
The formalities necessary to execute a will are designed in part to
ensure that the testator appreciates the gravity of the decisions he or
she is making. By contrast, the circumstances surrounding execution
of [plan] beneficiary designation forms for establishing retirement
accounts make it likely that the accountholder will not focus on the
importance of the designations.178
Indeed, “beneficiary designation forms financial institutions provide for
distribution of non-probate assets are often designed not to ensure effectuation
of decedent intent, but rather to minimize inconvenience for the financial
institution.”179 Since plan managers owe a fiduciary duty to participants and
beneficiaries under ERISA plans, failure to provide the employee with similar

174. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
175. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055(a), 1056(d)(3)(A) (2012).
beneficiary designations. Id.
176. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 177, 210.
177. Medill, supra note 171, at 507.
178. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 211.
179. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 64.
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formalities associated with execution of a last will and testament is a breach of
fiduciary duty prompting redress under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)’s guarantee of
appropriate equitable relief.
Pension and welfare benefits comprise a substantial portion of an employee’s
estate. ERISA plans track certain characteristics. First, the plans offer attractive
savings vehicles because there are tax benefits, they are easily entered into, and
they are portable in this mobile workforce. Commentators studying the
formation of plans, conclude that an “accountholder does not open [an] account
with succession rights in mind. Instead, the accountholder opens the account to
obtain tax deferral on savings for retirement—savings most accountholders
expect to use, not to pass on to successors.”180 Second, the employer chooses a
plan administrator to invest the funds and the employee may contribute or, as an
alternative, with an IRA, the employee chooses his or her own plan custodian.
Third, there is a contract signed by an employee, which designates a beneficiary,
with a default beneficiary provided explicitly, or in the plan documents. ERISA
provides that when an accountholder dies, his or her surviving spouse will
receive proceeds from the account unless the spouse waived that right.181 But
note that a “plan participant may designate a beneficiary or beneficiaries who
will receive the account proceeds if the plan participant dies before distribution
of the account.”182
Any designated beneficiary is subject to the claims of an accountholder’s
spouse.183 ERISA requires compliance with a very specific procedure to waive
a spouse’s statutory rights: the spouse’s waiver must be made after marriage, in
a writing that names an alternate beneficiary and that is executed in front of a
plan representative or notary public.184 Going forward, the spouse must consent
to any change of beneficiary designation.185 By definition, prenuptial
agreements fail to meet these exacting requirements: They are executed before
marriage, and thus do not divest a spouse of statutory survivorship rights.186 “In

180. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 209.
181. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(11)(A)(ii) (2006). QDROs provide an exception. See id. §
401(a)(13)(C). In addition, ERISA stipulates that waiver by a spouse must meet the requirements
of 26 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2)(A) that:
(i) the spouse of the participant consents in writing to such election,
(ii) such election designates a beneficiary (or a form of benefits) which may not be
changed without spousal consent (or the consent of the spouse expressly permits
designations by the participant without any requirement of further consent by the spouse),
and
(iii) the spouse’s consent acknowledges the effect of such election and is witnessed by a
plan representative or a notary public[.]
26 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).
182. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 173.
183. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012).
184. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).
185. Id.
186. See Leslie & Sterk, supra note 40, at 87–88.
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addition, couples may have difficulty complying with ERISA’s exacting timing
requirements.”187
“[M]any of the 401(k) forms are worded so as to actively encourage the
accountholder to write in his or her spouse’s name.”188 ERISA does require the
plan manager to provide the accountholder with a written explanation of the
financial implications of the benefit options, including the various options
provided to a spouse, within a specific period of time.189 A plan participant may
not modify or terminate his or her spouse’s rights unilaterally, but the spouse
may execute a waiver if it is done after the marriage, in the presence of a notary
or plan representative, and an alternative beneficiary must be named.190 The
effective means by which this may occur is through a QDRO, most often
executed as part of a divorce financial settlement. ERISA specifically provides
that an accountholder may designate a participant’s spouse, former spouse,
children, or other dependents with survivor benefits and other plan benefits by
means of QDROs.191 There are cases when the accountholder sought to change
the designated beneficiary through a valid last will and testament, but such
attempts were held to violate ERISA’s plan designated beneficiary rule and
hence are unenforceable.192 Likewise, prenuptial agreements, no matter how
well-worded, cannot serve as a valid waiver of ERISA’s benefits owed to a
spouse.193 Additionally, ERISA plans may not be altered by provisions in a
divorce decree that attempt to modify the designated beneficiary’s right to
receive proceeds under the plan,194 the one exception being a QDRO.195 There
are a number of requirements associated with QDROs, failing to match the
187. See id. at 72 n.57; see also Greenebaum & McDonald PLLC v. Sandler, 256 F. Appx 765,
767 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding there is little support for a prenuptial agreement’s ability to satisfy
ERISA’s spousal consent requirement); Robins v. Geisel, 666 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (D.N.J. 2009)
(prenuptial agreement did not waive spouse’s right to her husband’s pension fund).
188. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 187.
189. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1025, 1053(e); I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(a)(11)
(2017).
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1), (c)(1)–(2).
191. See id. § 1056(d)(3)(A). Note the domestic relations order (DRO) does not require
marriage, only that the accountholder’s companion was a dependent of the accountholder. See id.
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii); Owens v. Auto. Machinists Pension Tr., 551 F.3d 1138, 1146–47 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding a non-marital companion for thirty years was entitled to fifty percent of annuity
benefits the accountholder was receiving from an ERISA pension plan).
192. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300 (2009)
(holding the plan’s documents must be changed or it would otherwise jeopardize plan
administration efficiency).
193. See, e.g., Robins v. Geisel, 666 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (D.N.J. 2009); Greenebaum Doll &
McDonald PLLC v. Sandler, 256 F. App’x 765, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2007); Hagwood v. Newton, 282
F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2002); Nat’l Auto. Dealers & Assocs. Ret. Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496,
502 (8th Cir. 1996).
194. See Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 300 (holding plan documents control distribution of funds).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (defining a QDRO as a judgement, decree, or order that
relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse,
former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant).
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requirements exactly, results in an ineffective transfer of beneficiary status from
a spouse to a third party.196
B.

ERISA Preemption

To date, all controlling judicial decisions hold that the “Plan Terms Benefit
Mandate” controls the disposition of ERISA funds, specifying that the mandate
provided by the terms of the accountholder’s contract designation form cannot
be superseded by state rules of construction.197 Among these state rules are
community property rights, antilapse provisions, substitute gift rules, and most
often the subject of litigation, state statutes providing for revocation by operation
of law upon divorce. State statutes and rules of construction are preempted by
force of ERISA and the United States Constitution.198
Federal preemption of state laws is not automatic. Over the years, cases
evolved to explain that preemption applies whenever Congress attempts to
dominate any field of law, or when there is a direct conflict between federal and
state law.199 For example, field preemption applies if courts find there is a state
reference to ERISA or that the state statute acts directly upon the ERISA plan.200

196. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Leich-Brannan, 812 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(holding the divorce decree was an ineffective QDRO because the decree lacked sufficient clarity).
197. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016) (holding the
need for workable standards led the Court to reject uncritical literalism in applying ERISA’s
preemption clause); Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949 (2013) (holding that state laws which
stand as obstacles to the execution of Congress’s full purpose and objective are preempted);
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 150 (2001) (holding that the state statute
providing for revocation upon divorce was explicitly preempted by ERISA); Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (holding the designated surviving spouse must take the proceeds and that
states cannot freely change ERISA’s structure to balance individual state laws); Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 63 (1981) (holding a soldier’s second wife, the designated beneficiary of
the soldier’s life insurance, was entitled to the proceeds because of federal preemption and due to
the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of 1955); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)
(holding state law must always yield when in conflict with federal law); Wissner v. Wissner, 338
U.S. 655, 658 (1950) (holding “Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the
proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.”).
198. An extensive coverage of federal preemption is beyond the scope of this Article; however,
for conflict preemption, consult Gobeille, Hillman, and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. Gobeille,
136 S. Ct. at 946–50; Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1949–50; Egelhoff, 532 at 147–50; Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229–38 (1947) (holding that a federal statute regulating grain
storehouses preempted similar state regulations because Congress manifested its intention to
preempt state laws that would result in dueling regulations of grain storehouses).
199. See David M. Frankford & Sara Rosenbaum, Teaching Health Law: A Survivalist Guide
to Teaching ERISA, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 495, 499–504 (2017).
200. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (c)(1) (defining state laws as
any “laws, decisions, rules, regulation, or other State action having the effect of law, of any state.”);
see also Preemption—ERISA Preemption—Sixth Circuit Holds That ERISA Does Not Preempt
Michigan Medicaid Tax Law—Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549
(6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-593, 2017 WL 69264 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017), 130 HARV. L. REV.
1512, 1515 (2017) (stating Gobeille brought a more stringent approach to federal preemption of
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Preemption also applies if any state law presents an “impermissible connection”
with an ERISA plan.201 Congress excluded from federal preemption, two types
of state laws, thus permitting them to operate independently of congressional
action: state laws regulating insurance and banking202 and state laws enacted to
control criminal activity.203 There remains a nebulous area of state law that
federal courts remain willing to utilize even though application contradicts the
plan designated beneficiary mandate embraced by all major decisions applying
federal preemption. For example, even though there is no explicit reference to
barring “slayers” from taking proceeds under ERISA policies, the “slayers
statutes . . . always award the proceeds to someone other than the slayer”204 and
this beneficiary-change is applied consistently. To date, no federal court
specifically addresses whether the slayer statutes are preempted by ERISA, thus
permitting the possibility of an award of benefits to a slayer,205 but in fact no
slayer received ERISA proceeds. Some courts make mention of federal common
law as the basis for utilizing the state slayer statutes,206 but there remains
uncertainty.
To illustrate the uncertainty over slayer statutes, both the 1981 decision of
Ridgway v. Ridgway and the 2001 decision of Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, declined to
draw any inferences from slayer statutes and their utilization to override the
proceeds being paid to a designated beneficiary who was adjudicated a
murderer.207 Any implications from the use of slayer statutes to modify ERISA
plan designated beneficiaries is premature. Comparing the issue with taxation
issues, Professor Adam J. Hirsch suggests that a comparison be made with tax
law involving disclaimers. Both issues involve time, evolution, uncertainty, and
hence federal common law is a poor basis for concluding that slayers statutes
modify ERISA’s terms.

state policies); Joseph E. Zeis, Jr., Field Preemption and the Presumption of Federal Action: A
Three-Way Supremacy Clause Tug of War, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 157, 178–79 (2016).
201. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (providing that ERISA
“supersedes any and all state laws insofar as they may . . . relate to any [ERISA] plan”).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2).
203. Id. § 1144(b)(4).
204. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1689 (suggesting that because slayer cases are virtually
indistinguishable from state domestic relations statutes, there should be no preemption of them
either); see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 304 n.14
(2009); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001); Nale v. Ford Motor Co.
UAW Ret. Plan, 703 F. Supp. 2d 714, 722 (E.D. Mich. 2010). The Eight Circuit applied the
Arkansas state slayer statute explicitly in First National Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v.
Stonebridge Life Insurance Co., 9 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2010).
205. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1692. “The slayer rule is codified in the Restatements of
Property and Restitution, and in the Uniform Probate Code.” Id. at 1688.
206. See, e.g., Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1453 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
federal common law should be used to further ERISA’s goals). But see Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993) (holding federal common law is not authorized to revise ERISA’s text).
207. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 60 n. 9 (1981); Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152.
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Doubtless, the federal statute governing the validity of disclaimers for
tax purposes, as elaborated by federal regulations and case law, would
prove influential. But all of this would take time—quite a lot of time,
in fact, if splits developed between circuits over what the federal
common law should be. In the meantime, plan administrators would
face consolidated uncertainty . . . . Courts have highlighted the value
of certainty in connection with ERISA.208
Arguably, the most common form of ERISA preemption involves QDROs,
which offer the only form of modification of a plan-designated beneficiary
because any other attempted change is preempted.209 Upon the death of the
spouse of an accountholder, that spouse retains no community property right to
any pension funds earned by the accountholder.210 Death is not the same as
divorce. As a result of ERISA and REA, if an accountholder divorces his or her
spouse, then the federal statutes protect the rights of designate spouses, former
spouses, children and dependents of participants as beneficiaries of that pension
plan in accordance with any state domestic relations order that met standards
outlined in the QDRO.211 Nonetheless, any state domestic relations order that
does not meet the qualifications of a QDRO, and seeks to designate other
beneficiaries, is preempted and subject to anti-assignment prohibition.212 To
qualify as a QDRO the following are required: (1) a valid state domestic relations
order was issued; (2) the order clearly specified the plan, the beneficiaries, the
particular benefits; (3) the order was consistent with the pension plan’s terms;
(4) there was no increase in the plan’s actuarial costs; (5) payments may be made
even if the accountholder is not collecting benefits; and (6) former spouses may
be treated as spouses under defined circumstances.213 Once the QDRO is filed
correctly, the order must explicitly inform the accountholder of the pension
benefits the accountholder will lose, the alternate taker must be identified
208. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1905–06 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund,
493 U.S. 365, 376–77 (1990).
209. See Feuer, supra note 153, at 953–54 (“[T]he QDRO exclusion from the ERISA Explicit
Exemption appears to have only one purpose: to emphasize that state court orders that purport to
assign or create rights to non-pension benefits (welfare benefits, such as garnishment orders or
domestic relations orders pertaining to life insurance benefits) are preempted.”).
210. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 853–54 (1997) (holding that no community property
interest in an accountholder’s pension passed upon the death of the accountholder’s spouse to any
beneficiaries of that deceased spouse); see also Meghan A. Dupre, Comment, There Goes the
Community: Federal Preemption of Marriage as the Demise of the State Community Property
Regime, 90 TUL. L. REV. 185, 199–200 (2015).
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (2012); see generally GARY A. SHULMAN, THE QUALIFIED
DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HANDBOOK (3d ed. 2006); Employee Benefits Security
Administration, QDROs: The Division of Retirement Benefits Through Qualified Domestic
Relations Orders, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2014), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/fil
es/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/qdros.pdf.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A).
213. See id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)–(F).
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clearly, the number of payments specified, and amount of benefits allocated to
each alternate taker.214
Attorneys often fail to adequately advise clients as to the requirements for
entering into a valid QDRO, as well as failing to assess the benefits accrued
under ERISA pension plans when negotiating a divorce agreement between
contesting parties. As illustration, in one New York decision, a couple divorced
and the attorney for the wife of the employee/accountholder filed a QDRO
specifying that his client would receive a stipulated portion of the pension upon
the accountholder’s retirement.215 Nothing was mentioned in the QDRO
concerning the possibility of the accountholder’s death prior to retirement and
nothing was mentioned in the divorce agreement that was, incorporated but not
merged, into the divorce decree. The accountholder died prior to retirement and
it was discovered that the QDRO failed to stipulate that the former spouse was
not to receive survivorship benefits, only retirement benefits.216 Based on these
facts, the “plan administrator ultimately determined that because there was no
QDRO naming plaintiff as the surviving spouse under the plan, she was
ineligible under ERISA to receive preretirement death benefits.”217 After
divorce, the former spouse was no longer a spouse eligible to receive benefits.218
Furthermore, “only a QDRO can designate a former spouse to be a ‘surviving
spouse’ for purposes of allocating benefits under ERISA.”219 “This exception
to ERISA’s anti-assignment rule is not subject to judicial expansion.”220 In
addition, the divorce judgement obtained by the attorney for the surviving
former spouse, did not stipulate that she would receive survivorship benefits in
the spouse’s pension upon the spouse’s death.221 This omission, coupled with
the failure to provide for survivorship benefits under the QDRO, deprived the
surviving spouse of any share in the accountholder’s pension retirement after his
death.222 The court wrote: “[w]e therefore conclude that [the attorney’s] failure
to include preretirement death benefits in either the stipulation or the judgment,
and not his negligent failure to obtain a QDRO, was the cause of plaintiff’s
injury.”223
Accountholders who are married and covered under an ERISA pension plan
must provide spouses with specified benefits if married for more than a year, not
separated or abandoned by his or her spouse, or cannot locate his or her
214. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(C). While ERISA mandates disclosure to the accountholder, there is no
concomitant requirement that disclosure be made to the accountholder’s spouse.
215. McCoy v. Fineman, 785 N.E.2d 714, 716–17 (N.Y. 2002).
216. Id. at 717.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 720.
219. Id. at 720–21 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(F)).
220. Id. at 721.
221. McCoy v. Fineman, 785 N.E.2d 714, 721 (N.Y. 2002).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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spouse.224 Note however, that benefits referenced as welfare benefits, life
insurance, and disability payments are exempt from this requirement even
though, they form part of ERISA protection.225 Additionally, certain other types
of pension plans are exempt from the spousal protection requirement, permitting
accountholders to withdraw or borrow from the plans without the consent of his
or her spouse. First, plans that are not characterized as 401(k) plans, or those
with minimum funding rules.226 Second, plans that derive assets from sources
such as a defined benefit plan.227 Lastly, whenever an accountholder chooses to
receive the proceeds from the plan in the form of an annuity.228 Upon divorce,
a spouse designated as such in any ERISA plan remains eligible to receive
benefits as the plan’s designated beneficiary, either as a beneficiary of a welfare
plan such as life insurance, or as the beneficiary of a pension plan.229 However,
entitlement to notice and waiver prior to losing benefits is not a universal right
guaranteed under all ERISA protected plans.230 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
holds that state revocation by operation of law statutes are irrelevant to all
ERISA covered plans, thus preempting all state statutes that interfere with the
designated Plan Terms Designated Mandate,231 regardless of spousal rights in
those plans.
C. ERISA Accommodation
A properly constructed plan designated beneficiary form can accommodate
the policy goals of ERISA, avoid the preemption issue, and better ascertain the
evolving nature of an accountholder’s intent regarding distribution of plan
assets. Yet, there is scant evidence that plan managers are taking steps to
accommodate the changing future circumstances of employees. Professors Sterk
and Leslie examined the beneficiary designation forms used by ten of the largest
IRA providers in the United States and also examined a selection of firms
224. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(B). The plan manager may rely upon the assertion by the
accountholder and is not liable as a result of the fiduciary relief statute. Id. § 1055(c)(6). Section
1056(d)(3) makes reference to payments by QDRO. See also Vilas v. Lyons, 702 F. Supp. 555,
560–61 (D. Md. 1988) (holding fiduciaries are not obligated to look beyond the terms of the form
that complies on its face). But see Rice v. Rochester Laborers’ Annuity Fund, 888 F. Supp. 494,
498–500 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding a plan administrator cannot ignore clear warnings that an
accountholder’s assertions are false).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 144–46
(2001) (discussing a dispute between a surviving spouse and a former spouse who was named the
beneficiary of the decedent’s life insurance policy, the Court found that the person to whom the
decedent was married at the time of his death takes precedence if payment resulted from an ERISA
pension plan).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(B).
227. Id. § 1055(b)(1)(C)(iii).
228. Id. § 1055(b)(1)(C)(ii).
229. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 144–46.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(C), (c)(2).
231. See, e.g., Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150 (holding divorce did not revoke the life insurance
pension fund naming the former spouse as the designated beneficiary of those ERISA plans).
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offering 401(k) plans.232 First, they conclude, the forms themselves provide few
options for employees by which an accountholder might survey choices for
beneficiaries or to anticipate future changes of status.233 Second, fewer than half
of IRA providers suggest that plan participants consult with an attorney before,
or after, commencing employment.234 Third, the forms “provide absolutely no
notice” to the accountholder about exactly what would occur under the plan’s
default distribution provision, that is, who would take in the event that the plan’s
designated beneficiary does not take his or her share.235 Fourth:
Seven of the ten 401(k) forms include no discussion of divorce at all.
Of the remaining three, one indicates that divorce will not revoke the
beneficiary designation, a second indicates that the designation will
remain in effect even if “my marital status changes [unless I remarry],”
and a third highlights the fact that a remarriage will revoke the
designation without saying a word about the effect of divorce.236
Lastly, while “[e]mpirical evidence is difficult to gather on this point . . .
anecdotal evidence suggests that the accountholder will face a significant
bureaucracy problem” if the accountholder creates his or her own designated
beneficiary form, rather than choosing the one provided by the plan
administrator.237 They conclude stating, “in any event, the lawyer will be in a
better position than a client to persuade the account custodian to accept an
alternative designation form.”238
The solution to form inattentiveness advocated by Professors Sterk and Leslie
is to develop a beneficiary designation form that an accountholder will
understand and be able to complete in a manner reflecting his or her present and
future intent.239 To illustrate, wills, intestacy, and nonprobate transfers,
unencumbered by ERISA preemption, incorporate state rules of construction,
making it easier to accommodate a person’s changing intent.240 Among these
rules of construction, are provisions accommodating antilapse, substitute gift,
revocation by operation of law, slayer statutes, constructive trusts, and an
elective share mechanism for a surviving spouse.241 These professors suggest
that an approach which guides an accountholder through choices while
completing ERISA forms provided by employers is superior; going so far as to
232. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 201.
233. Id. at 202.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 203.
236. Id. at 203–04.
237. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 208–09.
238. Id. at 211–12
239. Id. at 215. The form would “mandate a statutory default designation and prominent
disclosure of that designation to the accountholder.” Id. The authors provide a model form as an
appendix. Id. at 231.
240. Id. at 207–08.
241. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 207–08.
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state rules of construction, which are often unknown to employees.242 In
addition, state rules only guess at what the accountholder intended, they
“represent both an incomplete approach to confusing forms and an approach that
threatens to distort the intent of many accountholders . . . .”243
Professors Sterk and Leslie propose a beneficiary designation form that
incorporates the following: First, the form should incorporate rules of
construction applicable to wills and nonprobate transfers, unless the
accountholder specifically opts out of them.244 Second, the designated
beneficiaries would be identified as a status person, for example, the person to
whom I am married at the time of my death, or, in the alternative, to my issue.245
“These designation are more likely to account for changes in the accountholder’s
life circumstances and therefore more likely to effectuate the accountholder’s
intent.”246 Third, the form should contain an explicit warning, consistent with
ERISA preemption, that any will or other instrument executed by the
accountholder, in the past or in the future, does not revoke or revise the plan’s
beneficiary designated on the form.247 Fourth, the form should adequately
advise the accountholder that he or she should consult an attorney prior to
establishing an estate plan, which purportedly includes the assets passing under
the designated beneficiary form under applicable state rules regarding
augmented estate.248 Fifth, the form should allow the accountholder to provide
an executor with the discretionary power to distribute the plan’s proceeds “in
such amounts as [beneficiaries] would have received if the account balance had
been included in the accountholder’s probate estate.”249 By providing an
executor with what amounts to an inter vivos power of appointment, the conflict
between federal preemption of state rules of construction and ERISA’s focus on
the designated beneficiary form is avoided. The argument for such a proposal
is that it permits the plan’s designated beneficiary to stand as written, or it
captures the amount into the accountholder’s estate, permitting the proceeds to
pass in accordance with the state’s rules of construction, or in accordance with
directions given to an executor.250 “Depending on which alternative appears to
best effectuate the accountholder’s intentions to avoid delays in distribution, the
form would require the executor to exercise the power within sixty days after
receiving notice of the accountholder’s death.”251

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 220–21.
Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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By offering options on the designated form executed by the accountholder,
the proposals made by Professors Sterk and Leslie shift the focus from the
vagaries of multiple state law to the goal of ERISA itself, which imposes a
fiduciary duty to enforce, “the documents and instruments governing the plan .
. . .”252 ERISA specifies that payments be made to a beneficiary who is
“designated by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan . . . .”253 Since the
form is the sole focus of attention when distributing assets governed by ERISA,
it makes sense to focus on the form’s provisions254 and thus any “invalidating
circumstances” becomes sufficiently clear so as to be administratively feasible
within the confines of ERISA’s national objectives.255
An illustration of the pivotal importance of a plan’s beneficiary designation
form occurred in the case of Kennedy v. Plan Administrators for DuPont Savings
& Investment Plan.256 The facts involved an employee covered under an ERISA
pension plan who designated his then current wife as the designated plan
beneficiary in accordance with the plan’s forms.257 He provided no alternate or
contingent beneficiary if she disclaimed her interest.258
The
employee/accountholder and his wife later divorced and as part of the financial
settlement his former wife signed a divorce decree divesting her of any interest
in any pension plan.259 After the divorce, the employee did not change his
pension plan’s designated beneficiary form so that the former spouse remained
the plan’s designated beneficiary at the time of his death.260 At the employee’s
death, the decedent’s daughter was responsible for his estate and she sought to
receive the pension funds of nearly $400,000 into the estate’s account, however,
the employer, DuPont, instead paid the proceeds to the plan’s designated
beneficiary, the former spouse, much to the consternation of the decedent’s
daughter.261
252. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2012); see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S.
141, 151 n.4 (2001); Langbein, supra note 5, at 1672–73.
253. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(8), 1104(a)(1)(D), 1056(d)(1) (providing that benefits under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated); Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151 (holding ERISA requires that
plans be administered, and benefits paid, in accordance with plan documents and not be affected
with conflicting state laws).
254. See, e.g., Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept.
3, 2015) (holding ERISA requires the plan’s form designated beneficiary to take proceeds from the
plan).
255. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In any event, in this case the
plan documents explicitly foresee that a beneficiary designation may become ‘invalid,’ but they do
not specify the invalidating circumstances”); see also Rosenbury, supra note 68, at 1852 (noting
that Congress is implicitly interested “in ensuring that the insurance proceeds will be paid to the
named beneficiary and that the beneficiary can use them”).
256. 555 U.S. 285 (2009).
257. Id. at 288.
258. Id. at 289.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 289–90.
261. Id.
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Initially, the federal district court ruled in favor of the daughter and ordered
the employer to pay the proceeds to her, rather than to the designated former
spouse from whom the decedent was divorced at the time of his death.262 The
district court based its ruling on the waiver signed by the former spouse at the
time of divorce, following a decision from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
2000. The district court ruled that a beneficiary may waive his or her right to
the proceeds from an ERISA plan if the waiver is “explicit, voluntary, and made
in good faith.”263 The former spouse appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the
ruling of the district court, holding the waiver as ineffective to deprive the former
spouse of her interest in the pension plan.264 The appellate court ruled that a
QDRO was the exclusive means by which a divorcing spouse may waive ERISA
benefits and that “mechanism [was] not invoked.”265 Eventually, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals and the
various state courts over “a divorced spouse’s ability to waive pension plan
benefits through a divorce decree not amounting to a QDRO.”266 In addition to
the specific issue raised, the facts gave the Court an opportunity to revisit the
issue of when it is possible for a beneficiary to waive his or her interest arising
from the plan documents. In 2009, the Court held a divorce decree did not
constitute a valid waiver under the terms of ERISA,267 instead the waiver by a
beneficiary promotes uncertainty, something anathema to ERISA plan policy.
The point is that by giving a plan participant a clear set of instructions
for making his own instructions clear, ERISA forecloses any
justification for enquiries into nice expressions of intent, in favor of
the virtues of adhering to an uncomplicated rule: “simple
administration, avoid[ing] double liability, and ensur[ing] that
beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without folderol essential
under less-certain rules.”268
The simplicity of plan administration is often mentioned as one of the
preeminent goals of ERISA,269 “[t]he congressional debates over ERISA suggest
262. Id.; see also Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding a spouse may
waive his or her spousal benefits under federal common law as long as the waiver is explicit,
voluntary, and made in good faith).
263. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 290 (quoting Manning, 212 F.3d at 874).
264. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 431 (5th Cir.
2007).
265. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 290–91 (emphasis added) (quoting Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 431).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 297 (explaining that under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), her waiver was not a QDRO
because it “did not constitute an assignment or alienation rendered void”).
268. Id. at 301 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (quoting Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers
Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990)).
269. See, e.g., Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
Congress wanted to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefit law, the goal being to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with
conflicting directives).
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that its preemption provisions stemmed from a related concern: achieving
administrative efficiency.”270 Efficiency is the motivation underlying the
Court’s adherence to the plan document rule mandating that the documents
executed by the accountholder, alone, form the basis of payment to designated
beneficiaries. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Justice
Souter’s 2009 decision in Kennedy, wrote, “plan administrators must ‘hew[ ] to
the directives of the plan documents’ rather than ‘examin[ing] a multitude of
external documents that might purport to affect the dispensation of benefits’ and
becoming ‘drawn into litigation like this over the meaning and enforceability of
waivers.”271 Likewise, when preempting a state law mandating disclosure of
medical records, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “one of
ERISA’s core functions . . . [cannot] be laden with burdens, subject to
incompatible, multiple and variable demands, and freighted with risk of fines,
breach of duty, and legal expense.”272
Simplicity of administration of ERISA benefits is a consistent theme
throughout all the major decisions enforcing ERISA preemption of state laws
and private settlement agreements. In 2001, Justice Thomas wrote that
mastering the laws of fifty states would “undermine the congressional goal of
‘minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]’ on plan
administrators—burdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries.”273 In 2013,
Justice Sotomayor, discussing the preemption by FEGLIA, held the Act
preempted a state statute that reassigned proceeds to be paid to a designated
beneficiary.274 FEGLIA, which provides low-cost group life insurance to federal
employees,275 is meant to provide a simple plan of payment to a designated
beneficiary, “[r]ather than draw an inference about an employee’s probable
intent from a range of sources, Congress established a clear and predictable
procedure for an employee to indicate who the intended beneficiary of his life
insurance shall be.”276 Simplicity of administration is implied as essential.277
270. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1903.
271. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010).
272. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 942 (2016) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 510 (2d Cir. 2014)); State Farm Life & Accident Assurance Co. v.
Goecks, 184 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708–09 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (holding a constructive trust could not be
imposed on proceeds paid to a designated beneficiary, opining that “[i]f permitted, this could
potentially expose not just beneficiaries, but employers and administrators to the nuances of 50
state laws, rather than federal law governing ERISA, contrary both to the Supreme Court’s Egelhoff
and the Seventh Circuit’s Melton decisions”).
273. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 149–50 (2001) (quoting IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
274. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949 (2013). But see Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 950
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (writing that a state’s efforts to track health care services and “the cost of
those services do not impermissible intrude on ERISA’s dominion over employee benefit plans[]”).
275. Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701–
8716 (2012).
276. Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1952.
277. See id. at 1953.
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Finally, in 2016, Justice Kennedy joined by a majority of the Court, held ERISA
preempted a Vermont statute that required all health insurance providers to file
reports with the state containing claims data.278 The Court concluded that
ERISA preempted the state reporting requirement so as to prevent the “States
from imposing novel, inconsistent, and burdensome reporting requirements on
plans.”279
Ease of administration is essential to the administration of ERISA, FEGLIA,
NSLIA, and SGLIA benefits and this may be accommodated in any
comprehensive revision of a plan’s designated beneficiary form. Professors
Sterk and Leslie advocate this approach, albeit with the admission that a revised
form may require additional burdens, delay in receiving the proceeds, and state
influence in implementing the form may be too onerous for federal goals.280 As
to the additional burden of a redesigned form, it would admittedly require “the
account custodian to locate the accountholder’s children, to figure out whether
the accountholder died married, or to figure out whether any deceased child left
surviving issue, would place a new and unwarranted burden on the custodian.”281
The authors of the proposed form assess this burden as “insubstantial”282 and
this seems logical in this age of computer generated searches. Any delay in
receipt of funds would not be excessive compared to receipt of funds associated
with other nonprobate or probate transfers at death, “[w]hatever delays remain
would be a small price to pay for effectuating the accountholder’s intent.”283
Additionally, the authors suggest “a statute could dictate the procedures the
custodian should follow and insulate the custodian from liability if he follows
those procedures.”284
All judicial decisions ruling in favor of ERISA preemption reference
congressional intent to disengage from state law entanglements.285 Therefore, a
revised designation form incorporating state rules of construction pertaining to
278. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 940.
279. Id. at 945.
280. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 222–24.
281. Id. at 222.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 223.
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 939 (2016) (“Pre-emption is
necessary in order to prevent multiple jurisdictions from imposing differing, or even parallel,
regulations, creating wasteful administrative costs and threatening to subject plans to wide-ranging
liability.”); Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953 (2013) (“If States could make alternative
distributions outside the clear procedure Congress established, that would transform this narrow
exception into a general license for state law to override FEGLIA.”); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel.
Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (“Uniformity is impossible . . . if plans are subject to different
legal obligations in different States.”); Bostic v. Bostic, No. 6:14-2130-BHH, 2015 WL 5178163,
at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2015) (“Congress wanted ‘to ensure that plans and plan sponsors be subject
to a uniform body of benefit law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden
of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal
Government’”) (citing Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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wills and nonprobate transfers is not likely to significantly detract from federal
policies of uniformity and efficiency. It appears the authors conclude that
“account custodians have a stake in the forms used, and an overwhelming
interest in reducing administrative costs.”286 The forms themselves still control
the distribution of the proceeds, any reference to state rules of construction
reflects consensus and the likelihood that the designation reflects the
accountholder’s wishes.287
In addition to redesigning the form itself, Professors Sterk and Leslie suggest
that accountholders be requested to complete periodic updates to their forms,
perhaps once every five years.288 Updates facilitate identification of current
beneficiaries and provide a more accurate gauge of the intent of the
accountholder.289 An updated form is also likely to decrease the administrative
burden of paying proceeds and accounting for named beneficiaries.290 It is
further suggested accountholders be notified to always consult with an attorney
when estate planning, “[i]f the designation form made accountholders aware that
consultation with a lawyer would avoid delay at the time for distribution, more
accountholders would likely seek advice before completing the forms.”291
The development and implementation of enhanced plan beneficiary
designation forms seems the appropriate vehicle by which to implement the
intent of the accountholder, and hence administer the plan consistent with
fiduciary duties. Enhanced forms are administratively simple, making periodic
inquiry of accountholders requesting updated forms seems logical, easy to
facilitate, and is included within the administrator’s fiduciary responsibility.
The lesson to learn from the litigation to date is that: “[n]o statutes or case law
preclude use of a more effective beneficiary designation form.”292
III. PRUDENTLY ACCOMMODATING ERISA
A.

Appropriate Equitable Relief

The terms of ERISA are enforced through exclusive federal jurisdiction.293
Federal courts are tasked with ensuring that plan participants or beneficiaries
may recover their benefits due under the plan or, alternatively, to enforce rights
286. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 224.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 224–25.
290. Id. at 225.
291. Id. at 227.
292. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 227. Professors Sterk and Leslie do not propose a
standardized form, but suggest that there should be incentives to use an “approved” form,
neglecting to specify if the incentives should arise because of federal or state legislation. Id.
293. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), (e)(1) (2012). But a beneficiary may file a claim in state court for
benefits provided under § 1132(a)(1)(B), but removal to federal court remains an option. See, e.g.,
Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992).
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to present or future benefits under the plan.294 When Congress enacted ERISA,
it was with the purpose of rectifying the inadequacy of past pension plans.295 In
1963, the automaker Studebaker, defaulted on its own pension plan created to
benefit employees prior to ERISA, resulting in the loss of financial security for
thousands of its’ current and retired workers.296 This loss prompted hearings
and debate, culminating in ERISA’s passage in 1974.297 Congress sought to
establish minimum standards of vesting, funding, and prudence to protect the
security of pension benefits—ultimately covering a substantial portion of the
American workforce.298 “Substantively, [ERISA] imposes a requirement of
mandatory trusteeship on pension and employee benefit plans; it absorbs the
core fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence from trust law and extends them to
govern all aspects of plan administration.”299 By imposing only the core
fiduciary duties, the courts modified whatever else might develop as the field
took shape.300 For example, courts fashioned remedies for “the duty to inform
beneficiaries about significant aspects of trust administration; the duties to
collect, segregate and earmark, and protect trust property; and the duties to
enforce and defend claims.”301
Undoubtedly, Congress intended to remove employee pension and welfare
benefits from the management of corrupt individuals and organizations.
Investigations by the Senate’s McClellan Committee, “led by its chief counsel,
Robert F. Kennedy, found widespread looting of plan funds through sweetheart
deals, kickback, and various forms of cronyism.”302 As a result, ERISA requires
plan managers to follow written claims procedures, to give reasons for denials,
and to provide an appellate procedure for any denial of benefits by “the
appropriate named fiduciary” who is subject to ERISA’s duties of loyalty and
294. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)
(holding ERISA protects contractually assigned benefits).
295. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 69, at 68–72.
296. For a description of a pre-ERISA plan’s default, look at Pension and Employee Benefit
Law. Id.; see also James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 684 (2001).
297. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639; see also
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000); Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S.
SEN. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1, 6–24 (1984).
298. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–2.
299. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1319. Welfare plans administered by ERISA are also subject
to fiduciary law, but these programs are excused from other substantive rules, such as vesting, antireduction, and plan funding rules, and the plan termination programs that guarantees payment of
other benefits. Id. at 1323–24 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a), 1102(a)(1)).
300. Id. at 1319–20.
301. Id. at 1326–27; Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (holding trust law offers
only a starting point whereby the courts will need to examine competing congressional purposes);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) (holding courts should be guided
by principles of trust law in fashioning judicial review standards).
302. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1324 (footnotes omitted).
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prudence.303 ERISA establishes monetary fines to be levied against any plan
administrator who fails to provide requested information to a plan participant
within thirty days after the receipt of a request.304 Therefore, Congress enacted
ERISA so that if an employee is promised a pension benefit, the employee will
actually receive it.305 Also, the policy goal is to ensure ERISA’s plan managers
are held to a fiduciary standard of conduct that requires “adequate public
disclosure of the plan’s administrative and financial affairs.”306
ERISA provides for an expansive fiduciary definition. There are fiduciaries
specified by the plan itself, or fiduciary status can be anyone who exercises
“discretionary control or authority” over the plan’s management, administration,
or assets.307 Thus, companies or individuals are either named fiduciaries or the
functional equivalent, each determined according to the plan documents or by
exercising decision-making authority.308 However, even if a fiduciary
permissibly delegates plan management to others, the designated fiduciary is
presented with the duty to monitor the performance of the individuals or entity
to whom delegation is given.309 The only restraint upon the status of fiduciary
is “fiduciaries must be fiduciaries with respect to the particular activity at
issue.”310
The duty of prudence formulated under ERISA owed by fiduciaries is
commensurate with trust law and yet the statute provides few details. Professor
Langbein argues the minimalist language in ERISA was intentional, meant to
permit ERISA to draw upon the depth of trust law’s equity experience.311
Professor Langbein criticizes the Court’s failure to recognize the depth and
inclusiveness of, for example: ERISA’s loyalty and prudence norms, “as well as
the intimate functional connection between those rules and the remedy
provisions of ERISA . . . .”312 The consequence is that “the Court has been
treating ordinary applications of traditional fiduciary and remedy law as
303. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
304. See id. § 1132(c) (cataloging penalties).
305. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571
(1985); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980).
306. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655.
307. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993); see also Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank
v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 238 (2000) (“Section 502(a)(3)’s authorization to a
plan ‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary’ to bring a civil action for ‘appropriate equitable relief”
extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary ‘party in interest’ to a prohibited transaction barred by §
406(a).”). For a general discussion of who constitutes a fiduciary, look at Pension and Employee
Benefit Law. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 69, at 648–62.
308. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2009);
STEPHEN J. KRASS, PENSION ANSWER BOOK Q 23:1 (2018).
309. Delegation authority is granted under 29 U.S.C. § 1103.
310. Fadely v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1409-TWT, 2011 WL
4974857, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2011) (citing Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267,
1277 (11th Cir. 2005)).
311. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1363.
312. Id. at 1329.
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impermissible extensions of the statute.”313 Instead, the Court should draw upon
the rich tradition already in existence.314 Specifically, Professor Langbein
suggests courts should not preempt remedies outside the specific text of ERISA,
but instead should include preexisting remedies as part of the “equitable relief”
specified in ERISA itself.315 Traditionally, when trustees breach their fiduciary
duties, the law of trusts long exhibited a remedial system that “allows for
recovery of loss, restitution of profits, and recovery of foregone gains.”316
Nonetheless, Professor Langbein argues the Court fails to grasp the impact of
ERISA’s equitable relief,317 criticizing a series of Supreme Court decisions,
suggesting that the equitable relief promised in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), “should
have been understood to include make-whole monetary relief for consequential
injury as well as specific relief.”318
Assuming Professor Langbein’s rationale is correct, what are the limits to the
equitable relief granted in § 1132(a)(3)? If ERISA’s procedures and remedies
“suffer from major omissions that the courts have had to supply from context,”
the argument that traditional trust law provides the “equitable relief” needed is
bolstered.319 In other words, “[w]hen Congress uses . . . conceptual language,
Congress necessarily intends for the courts to interpret it—to supply the
specifics.”320 This is commensurate with the argument put forth by Professor
Langbein that:
Congress federalized the law of pension and benefit plan
administration for the primary purpose of protecting plan participants
and beneficiaries through a triple regime of mandatory trusteeship,
extensive fiduciary duties, and commensurate remedies. Those
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1338.
315. Id. at 1332 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). Professor Langbein objects to Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Mertens, which “construed ‘appropriate equitable relief’ in section [1132(a)(3)] to
preclude monetary damages for consequential injury on the ground that such relief was not ‘typical’
of pre-fusion equity.” Id. at 1364.
316. Id. at 1334. Section 1132(a) permits a civil action to be brought, with § 1132(a)(1) serving
as “the workhorse of ERISA remedy law under which routine benefit denial and other ERISA
claims proceed.” Id.
317. Id. at 1335 (citing examples of the Court’s missed opportunity to utilize trust law to
provide remedies, such as Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216–17
(2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260–62 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985)).
Characterizing the damages issue in such cases as contractual (in the sense of
‘extracontractual’) rather than fiduciary further underscores the great failing in the
Supreme Court’s handling of ERISA remedy issues in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West:
the Court’s neglect of the trust law basis of ERISA remedy law in interpreting the
authorizations for equitable relief in section 502(a).
Id. at 1346.
318. Id. at 1338.
319. Id. at 1345.
320. Id. at 1363.
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remedies, all derived from the make-whole tradition of the law of
trusts, sound exclusively in equity and include money damages for
consequential injury.321
It follows that the law of trusts can view the failure to provide adequate plan
forms and subsequent inquiry as breach of fiduciary responsibility, mandating
that plan managers comply with the terms of the beneficiary mandate rule,
compensating those victimized by the breach.
B.

Plan Managers

Applying statutory provisions to current factual situations is the crux of legal
practice. Thus, it is necessary to apply ERISA’s statutory civil action entitlement
given to individuals to enforce benefits arising thereunder. Logically, cases
illustrate that plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative remedies under the
ERISA plan before commencing action in courts.322 Once administrative
remedies are exhausted, plaintiffs are free to petition the courts to redress
grievances under either § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits due under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.323
That particular ERISA provision is not used to “reform” terms of the plan, but
rather is only being used to enforce present and prospective rights under the
terms as stated.324 Any change in plan terms, no matter how equitable the claim,
should not be “inferred without evidence of a concomitant awareness of its
gravity on the part of the Congress . . . .”325
Section 1132(a)(3) permits a separate cause of action that arises under §
1132(a)(1)(B). Under § 1132(a)(3), a civil action may be brought by:
[A] participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan.326

321. Id. at 1365–66. The author criticizes Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Mertens,
which restrained the monetary relief available through equity. Id. at 1321.
322. See Park v. Tr. of 1199 SEIU Health Care Emps. Pension Fund, 418 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351,
357 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
323. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 435–37 (2011) (holding the ERISA provision
directs enforcement of the plan’s terms as stated).
324. See Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2016); see also
Singletary v. UPS, 828 F.3d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 2016); Pender v. Bank of Am. Corp., 788 F.3d 354,
361–62 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding plaintiffs may not use section 502(a)(1)(B) to seek relief outside
the plan’s terms); Ross v. Rail Car Am. Grp. Disability Income Plan, 285 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir.
2002).
325. Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, No. 06-CV-2280 (JPO), 2017 WL 3142067, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017).
326. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012); see, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 119 (1989) (holding a participant includes a former employee where there is a reasonable
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In one illustration, an employee, under a defined benefit plan, made
contributions to her plan throughout her employment with the New York
University Medical Center, from 1976 until her death in 1998.327 Allegedly, two
years before her death, the employee contacted the pension fund manager in an
attempt to change the beneficiary of her pension from her estranged husband to
her two children, but the manager was allegedly unresponsive.328
Representatives of the fund denied that the employee ever contacted them and
further alleged that they employed staff to respond to employee telephone
inquiries.329 Nonetheless, the employee died prior to retirement and her
estranged husband remained the beneficiary of her pension fund, even though
the two remained married, but were in fact separated.330
An attorney representing the employee’s estate requested the pension fund
proceeds, but the fund manager informed the pension funds are to be paid to the
employee’s husband since he was the plan’s designated beneficiary.331
Thereafter, the estranged husband purportedly waived his right to the pension,
but he never contacted the fund manager, nor did he exhaust the fund’s
administrative appeals process.332 The estate of the decedent filed suit against
the fund because of the fund’s refusal to violate the plan’s designated beneficiary
rule, alleging that the estate, not the estranged husband, is the rightful intended
beneficiary of the fund proceeds. The estate argues the terms of ERISA provide
it with standing to pursue civil action,333 but the plan managers disagreed,
asserting that ERISA defines a beneficiary as someone designated by a
participant in the plan, or by the terms of the employee’s plan who is or may be
entitled to a benefit under the plan.334 In addition to ERISA’s definition, the
plan’s documents define a beneficiary as the “person or persons, including your
spouse that you designate to receive payments from the Pension Fund after your
death.”335 Despite the apparent definitional disparity, the estate argued it is a
bona fide beneficiary under the terms of the plan because it could become a
beneficiary in the future and that this is sufficient to provide standing.336
expectation of returning to covered employment or where there is colorable claim to vested
benefits).
327. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 348.
328. Id. at 349. An affidavit was submitted from a co-worker of the employee which alleged
the employee called the number in the pension plan booklet but no one returned her call. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
333. Id. at 350 (“Section 1132(a)(1) authorizes suits by a ‘participant or beneficiary,’ Section
1132(a)(3) authorizes suits by a ‘participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,’ and Section 1132(g)(1)
authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and costs in an action brought by a ‘participant, beneficiary,
or fiduciary.’”).
334. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)).
335. Id.
336. Id.

480

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:432

The district court disagreed with the estate’s interpretation of who constitutes
a beneficiary able to bring suit under ERISA because the decedent employee
died before retirement, still validly married, her spouse is the only person
eligible to be designated as a beneficiary under her pension plan.337 The court
reasoned:
If [the employee] had submitted an application to receive her pension
benefits before she died, as required for her to have been able to
designate a beneficiary other than her spouse, she could have named a
different beneficiary if she obtained spousal consent or a lost spouse
waiver. Because she did not perform either of these acts, the Estate is
not and never was eligible to be designated a beneficiary of her
benefits.338
In defining who is a beneficiary permitted to bring suit, the court held, “mere
possibility” that the estate could become the beneficiary is insufficient to
establish standing under ERISA § 1132.339
By refusing to recognize the “potential beneficiary” status for purposes of
granting standing to the employee’s estate, the court relies upon a familiar policy
expressed throughout many ERISA decisions: the plan’s designated beneficiary
rule.340 In addition, the court references established judicial policy holding §
1132(a)(3) strictly limits the plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions,341
and that “absent clear Congressional expression, the courts do not have
jurisdiction over actions brought by non-enumerated parties.”342 Nonetheless,
even though the court held the estate lacked standing to pursue its claims as a
beneficiary, the court did discuss whether the employee was “likely prejudiced”
because of unawareness to the spousal waiver provisions, the lost spouse
exception to a spouse’s claim, or that the pension fund managers failed to
respond to the employee.343 In dicta the court recognizes the value of equitable
considerations in the processing of ERISA claims. Hence, one interpretation is
337. Id. at 351.
338. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
339. Id. (citing Coleman v. Champion Int’l Corp., 992 F.2d 530, 533 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993), in
which “a pension plan participant’s son not designated a beneficiary lacked standing to maintain
an ERISA action in both his individual capacity and his capacity as the representative of the
deceased participant’s estate”).
340. See, e.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1948 (2013) (holding the designated
beneficiary form takes precedence unless defined exceptions are followed); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff
ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (holding the fiduciary shall administer the plan in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan).
341. Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (citing Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000)).
342. Id. at 352 (citing Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Cont’l
Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also American Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem
Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 361 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding a group of physicians lacked standing
to sue under ERISA on behalf of their patients).
343. See Park, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 352–57.
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that the plan manager’s failure to adequately provide information and inquiry to
an employee under the plan resulted in the unjust enrichment of the plan’s
designated beneficiary, justifying a claim by the estate of the employee for
restitution. Was it sufficient that the employee was given a summary plan
description, as required by federal regulations, when she commenced
employment?344 Did the plan managers make inquiry of the employee
throughout her employment? Admittedly, neither the employee’s estranged
husband, nor the decedent’s estate, exhausted the administrative remedies
available under the pension plan.345 Instead, the estate, with the assistance of
the estranged husband, immediately sought a judicial remedy, a remedy only
permitted once all administrative remedies are exhausted.346 The court implies
that equity aids the vigilant and that administrative remedies must be exhausted
or plaintiff must prove clearly and convincingly that such a pursuit is futile.347
Otherwise, “plaintiff is seeking a heartier bite at the apple in federal court—one
with more teeth.”348
Do equitable claims require exhaustion of administrative remedies? Despite
the holding in Park v. Trustees of 1199 Seiu Health Care Employees Pension
Fund that under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) any plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies unless excused because of futility, the court concedes
that “the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not yet addressed whether
these procedures are required for claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) for
alleged breach of fiduciary duty.”349 Section 1132(a)(3) provides that a civil
action may be brought, in part, to “obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan[.]”350 Also, the court in Shamoun v. Board of Trustees, cites
to a Second Circuit decision, holding there is no exhaustion requirement for
ERISA statutory claims that do not arise under the plan’s policy, for example,
an employee’s right not to be terminated for seeking benefits or breach of

344. Id. at 353–54 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (2000) and 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (2004)).
345. See id. at 351–54.
346. Id. at 345, 357.
347. Id. at 355–57.
348. Diamond v. Local 807 Labor-Mgmt. Pension Fund, No. 12-CV-5559 (RRM)(VVP), 2014
WL 527898, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2014). But see Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 91–
92 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding fiduciary claims are subject to administrative exhaustion to prevent
nullification of the exhaustion requirement).
349. Park v. Tr. of 1199 SEIU Health Care Emps. Pension Fund, 418 F. Supp. 2d 343, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
350. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012). There are multiple Supreme Court decisions that illustrate
the Court’s perspective on the scope of equitable relief. See Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Medical
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361 (2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 209 (2002); Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Solomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 243 (2000);
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261–
63 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148–49 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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fiduciary duty.351 Claims that do not arise because of the terms of the plan, are
appropriately addressed under § 1132(a)(3), the one providing for “other
appropriate equitable relief.”352
Equitable relief is possible under the following conditions: first, establishment
of beneficiary status; second, exhaustion of administrative means or proven
futility as applicable; and third, establishment of an equitable claim.353 The
Second Circuit ruled that plan administrators may be sued as defendants under
§ 1132(a)(3), providing for equitable relief whenever there is inadequate relief
provided in other sections of ERISA.354 The pivotal elements necessary to
support liability is that the plan administrators exercised total control over the
claims process.355 The equitable remedies provided by § 1132(a)(3) are meant
to supplement remedies that are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for a
defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty.356 Thus, money awards are available under
§ 1132(a)(3), but “only in very limited circumstances.”357 Examples are,
equitable restitution for loss resulting from a trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty,
or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment.358 If, as Professor Langbein
suggests, ERISA was enacted with minimalist language to permit inclusion of
all forms of equitable relief available under the law of trusts, then § 1132(a)(3)
should be read inclusively, allowing arguments to retrieve proceeds from
persons unjustly enriched through the breach of fiduciary responsibility of plan
managers.
The extent of equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) is the primary issue. It
remains uncertain how far courts will go, under the terms of the ERISA, to
provide equity to persons clearly intended by the plan participant to receive
benefits but who were thwarted by mistake, inadequate information, and the
351. Shamoun v. Bd. of Trs., 357 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Kennedy v.
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Nechis v. Oxford
Health Plans, 421 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiffs’ lack of standing prevented Nechis
from stating a legally cognizable claim, and that therefore the court did not need to decide whether
administrative exhaustion was a prerequisite to a statutory ERISA claim); Wegmann v. Young
Adult Institute, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 3815 (KPF), 2016 WL 8711557, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016)
(concurring with the holding of Shamoun, but holding that failure to exhaust would frustrate the
goals of ERISA).
352. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
353. See, e.g., Wegmann, 2016 WL 8711557, at *2–3 (holding plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies under ERISA prior to bringing an action under §1132(a)(1)(B)).
354. See N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, v. UnitedHealth Grp., 798 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2015).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 134.
357. Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 06-CV-2280 (JPO), 2017 WL 3142067, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2017); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (holding
equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) is equitable in nature, and therefore injunction, mandamus, and
restitution are options). But see Langbein, supra note 1, at 1320 (arguing that “‘equitable relief’
should be correctly interpreted to include money damages”).
358. See Laurent, 2017 WL 3142067, at *9 (citing CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421,
441–42 (2011)).
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plan’s designated beneficiary rule. Several questions naturally follow: Is it
possible for the courts to reform the terms of a plan document?359 What level of
proof is required? Who may bring suit to reform the document? In a 2014
decision, the Second Circuit ruled a contract may be reformed due to mistake of
both parties, or where one of the parties is mistaken and the other commits fraud
or engages in inequitable conduct.360 These remedies are available under federal
common law, justifying reformation under equity principles whenever necessary
to rectify fraud or to correct mutual mistake.361 Also in 2014, the Ninth Circuit
ruled on a petition to reform an ERISA plan based on a plaintiff’s mistaken belief
of the terms of the plan.362 The plaintiff petitioned based on equitable estoppel
or reformation on the basis that the ERISA plan administrator erroneously
informed him that he would receive benefits upon retirement, even though he
released his claim to benefits several years prior.363 The plan discovered its error
and ceased payment, causing the plaintiff economic hardship.364 The plaintiff
then sought to apply equitable estoppel to prevent the fund from reverting to its
corrected understanding of the terms of the plan.365 The court refused to apply
equitable estoppel, ruling against the claimant’s petition to reform the terms of
the plan, writing:
We next turn to Gabriel’s claim that he is entitled to the equitable
remedy of reformation. To qualify for reformation of the Plan based
on mistake under trust or contract law principles, Gabriel would need
to demonstrate that “a mistake of fact or law affected the terms” of the
Plan, the relevant trust instrument here, and introduce evidence of the
trust settlor’s (or contractual parties’) true intent. Gabriel cannot meet
this standard as a matter of law, because the Plan itself does not
contain an error. Gabriel concedes that he was a sole proprietor of
Twin Cities from 1975 to 1978 and ineligible to participate in the Plan
during that time, and therefore the Fund’s current, corrected records
accurately reflect the agreement between Gabriel and the Fund.
Instead, Gabriel wants to reform the Fund’s administrative records to
conform to the misinformation provided by the plan representative.
But reformation does not extend so far. The administrative records
are not part of the Plan, and the Fund’s mistaken administrative

359. See, e.g., Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, 421 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting in
dicta that reformation is possible when there is fraud, mutual mistake, or terms in violation of
ERISA). But see DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F. Supp. 258, 273
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a court may order a defendant to reform a plan in violation of ERISA
but may not rule on the court’s power to reform an ERISA pension plan).
360. Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 775 F.3d 510, 525–26 (2d Cir. 2014).
361. Id. at 525–26.
362. See Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2014).
363. Id. at 949, 951.
364. Id. at 951–52.
365. Id. at 952.
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records did not reflect the parties’ true intent in entering into the Plan.
Accordingly, the remedy of reformation due to mistake is not
applicable in this context.366
Judicial reformation allows courts to accommodate the actual intent of the
decedent and is available only in cases of fraud or mistake, not “to impose
personal liability . . . for a contractual obligation to pay money—relief that was
not typically available in equity.”367 What if a plan administrator failed to advise
an employee, or failed to make inquiry to update information from an employee,
is the plan manager in breach of his or her fiduciary responsibility? Courts hold
that when an employer advises employees to make certain elections related to
employee benefits, that the employer acted as a fiduciary in that context because
the employer was acting as a plan administrator.368 Failing to advise or to make
inquiry is discretionary, another element of fiduciary responsibility.369 It may
be easier to hold that an employer breaches fiduciary duty when he or she
intentionally misrepresents facts resulting in injury to an employee. The more
difficult issue is whether the employer breaches his or her fiduciary duty when
he or she negligently misrepresents facts that result in employee injury.
Negligent misrepresentation is actionable as a breach of fiduciary duty.
Negligent misrepresentation was one of the issues raised in a 2011 district
court decision, Fadely v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc..370 The facts
involved an employee with substantial health problems who was terminated by
his company shortly after his sixty-fifth birthday.371 Following his termination,
the employer advised the employee to enroll in COBRA rather than Medicare
Part B, to which he was entitled.372 Relying upon the employer’s advice, the
employee enrolled in COBRA and as a result, suffered substantial financial
costs.373 Thereupon the employee sued his employer, alleging breach of the duty
owned him under ERISA.374 Specifically, that his employer owed a fiduciary
duty to him as a former employee and that the employer: (1) refused to provide
366. See id. at 961–62 (citations omitted).
367. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); see also In re
Estate of Duke, 352 P.3d 863, 867 (Cal. 2015) (holding that “reformation is permissible if clear and
convincing evidence establishes an error in the expression of the testator’s intent and establishes
the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted”).
368. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 492, 502–03 (1996) (holding employers engaged
in deliberate deception by advising employees to accept a change of plan, which was to the
employees’ financial detriment).
369. Pohl v. Nat’l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128–29 (7th Cir. 1992).
370. Fadely v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-1409-TWT, 2011
WL4974857, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ga. 2011); see also Pledger v. Reliance Tr. Co., 240 F. Supp. 3d
1314, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (holding plaintiff must specify how § 1132(a)(3) applies for the court
to grant relief).
371. Fadely, 2011 WL4974857, at *1.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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him with requested information; (2) made misrepresentations; (3) breached its
duty to him based on these misrepresentations; (4) failed to notify him on a
timely basis of an adverse benefit determination; (5) failed to provide specific
plan provisions that were pertinent to him; and (6) failed to provide a description
of the review appeals process.375
The court permitted the former employee to proceed with his claim of breach
of fiduciary duty through negligent misrepresentation.376 Similarly, in 2014,
another federal district court permitted a plaintiff to proceed with a claim based
on negligent misrepresentation and brought under § 1132(a)(3).377 The court
wrote:
Jump plainly has met this standard for pleading purposes as to
Northern Tier. He alleges that Northern Tier misled him beginning in
December 2010 by providing him with information stating that he
would be eligible for subsidized health benefits under the Northern
Tier plan. Northern Tier argues that Jump does not allege that he read
the presentation materials at issue, but the Complaint clearly alleges
otherwise. Jump alleges that he was further misled by Northern Tier’s
September 2011 presentation, which expressly states that Northern
Tier will ‘recognize Speedway service for eligibility and vesting in
benefit plans [.]’ Although the latter presentation did not specifically
address the subsidy, Jump alleges that he believed that Northern Tier’s
failure to address the subsidy meant that the December 2010 statement
remained accurate. Jump further alleges that Northern Tier never
disclosed that a subsidy would not be available to Jump before he
decided to join Northern Tier. Finally, Jump alleges that Northern
Tier’s misrepresentations and omissions led him to terminate his
employment with Speedway and join Northern Tier to his detriment.
He claims that he would have simply retired from Speedway had he
known that he was not entitled to a subsidy under the Northern Tier
Plan.378
Both federal court decisions illustrate the possibility of alleging a violation of
an employer’s duty to provide employees with comprehensive plan information
forms and complementary follow-up throughout employment. Arguably, failure
to provide these necessary elements results in action under § 1132(a)(3), “to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief . . . ,” permitting recovery under a theory
of negligent misrepresentation. Cases also illustrate that the universe of
potential defendants in an equitable breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit (§
1132(a)(3)) is larger than the universe of potential defendants in a claim to

375.
376.
377.
378.

Id.
Id. at *4–6.
Jump v. Speedway LLC, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1030–31 (D. Minn. 2014).
Id. at 1031 (citations omitted).
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recover benefits under the terms of the plan (§ 1132(a)(1)(B))—with plaintiffs
to recover losses more easily and with expanded standing.
C. Accountability
ERISA strives for certainty and simplicity.379 Born from the goals established
by Congressional committees meeting during the 1950s and 1960, concurrent
with federal departments and presidential commissions, their priority remains to
provide employees with secure pension and welfare benefits, and concomitantly
to provide employers with tax incentives to incentivize employee stability and
security. Certainty underlies federal preemption of contradictory state laws and
procedures, guaranteeing income for surviving spouses and children, and
reliance upon the ERISA plan manager to administer the plan “solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . ,”380 avoiding self-serving
behavior.381 To ensure certainty and simplicity, plan managers are expected to
exercise skill and care and the diligence of a prudent person acting in like
capacity.382 Most pertinently, plan managers owe a duty to inform plan
participants and beneficiaries about significant aspects of trust administration,383
the imprudent response to which is illustrated in the ongoing judicial controversy
surrounding revocation by operation of law.384
What is the extent of a plan manager’s fiduciary duty to disclose to plan
participants the significant aspects of the plan? At a minimum, the plan manager
may not intentionally mislead, deceive, or fraudulently induce.385 In a 2003
decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court
discussed the responsibility of the plan manager to disclose significant facts to
the plan participants.386 The court considered the opinions of other circuits as
well as the pertinent fiduciary decisions from the United States Supreme
Court.387 The facts of the Fifth Circuit case involved company employees who
inquired of their employer’s representatives “whether the company planned to
implement an enhanced retirement incentive program . . . .”388 The company
managers told the employees that they knew nothing of any plan and, based on
379. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“Congress’[s] desire to offer
employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not
to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly
discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.”).
380. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
381. Id. § 1106(b)(1).
382. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 571 (1985).
383. See, e.g., Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1993); Berlin v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163–64 (6th Cir. 1988).
384. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1326–27.
385. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 415, 430 (5th Cir. 2003).
386. Id. at 430–31.
387. Id. at 429–30.
388. Id. at 409.
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this information, the employees took an early retirement rather than wait for an
incentive program.389 One month later, the company announced an incentivized
early retirement program that provided an additional year’s salary, but the nowretired former employees, missed this opportunity based on the employer’s
information leading them to retirement.390 The employees filed suit against the
company alleging the employer’s representatives breached their fiduciary duty
by defrauding them.391
The Fifth Circuit ruled the company did not owe an affirmative duty to
disclose to the plan participants the status of its internal discussions concerning
a change in the retirement program.392 Hence, the statements made by company
managers did not constitute a material misrepresentation and therefore, were not
fraudulent.393 But the decision goes further by outlining the parameters of a plan
manager’s duty to disclose on a broader scale.394 The opinion begins its analysis
with the acknowledgement that ERISA’s fiduciary duties rely upon the common
law of trusts.395 The court then proceeds to review a 1996 Supreme Court
decision, Varity Corporation v. Howe.396 While the Court in Varity held it was
a breach of fiduciary duty for a company employee to intentionally mislead an
employee, the decision declined to address “whether ERISA fiduciaries have
any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information . . . in response to employee
inquiries.”397 What then is the fiduciary responsibility of a plan administrator to
provide employees with information concerning ERISA plans? The Fifth
Circuit suggest that the duty to disclose in a neutral fashion under ERISA is
vague, writing “that the Supreme Court, while not having spoken on this precise
question, has defined in general terms an employer’s responsibility to
communicate truthfully with its employees regarding the future of benefit
plans.”398 But then, “Congress had no need to spell out the details, and
considerable reason not to do so when legislating for a new field whose contours
were not yet fully known.”399
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 2003).
392. Id. at 432.
393. Id. at 431–32. The court specified that it held only that “the lack of serious consideration
does not equate to a free zone for lying.” Id. at 428.
394. Id. at 420–21.
395. Id. at 411.
396. Id. at 413–16 (summarizing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)).
397. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 506.
398. Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 413 (5th Cir. 2003).
399. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1329. Langbein buttresses his assertions by listing areas where
ERISA is silent, noting that equitable powers should be read broadly, and that ERISA’s language
is not comprehensive as written. Id. at 1345. Langbein notes that: (1) there is a lack of specificity
as to when there should be jury trials; (2) there is no specified standard of judicial review or plan
decision-making; (3) there is a lack of specification for payment of attorney fees; and (4) there is a
lack of specificity about when punitive damages should be assessed. Id.
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Empirical evidence sufficiently indicates that employment forms affecting
pension and welfare benefits offer inadequate choices by which employees may
express their intent within a continually changing interpersonal milieu.400
Furthermore, estate planning attorneys consulting with divorcing clients,
committed nonmarital clients, or estate planning clients are inexperienced with
ERISA’s preemption and its consequences.401 Do these occurrences justify
accusing either the plan managers or estate planning attorneys with a breach of
fiduciary responsibility to their clients? If failure to provide an employee with
adequate means by which he or she may express intent regarding the distribution
of fund proceeds, then the answer is certainly yes. This is true regardless if the
payment arises from either a pension or a welfare plan administered under
ERISA, “Congress deliberately included nonpension plans within ERISA’s
fiduciary and remedy provisions, and Congress took no distinction within
ERISA remedy law between pension and nonpension plans.”402
Professor Langbein is of the opinion that “courts that interpret ERISA should
be hesitant to conclude that remedies routinely available in pre-ERISA trust law
fall outside the meaning of Congress’ authorization of ‘equitable relief’ under
ERISA.”403 Traditionally, Professor Langbein argues:
An aggrieved trust beneficiary may sue . . . either in his or her own
right or on behalf of the trust. He or she may recover (1) for loss
incurred, (2) for any profits that the trustee made in breach of trust,
and (3) for any gains that would have accrued but for the breach.404
The wording used by Congress in § 1132(a)(3), entitling a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary to obtain “other appropriate equitable relief” was
intended to “facilitate adaptation to new problems that might be encountered as
ERISA transposed trust remedy law to the novel terrain of pension and benefit
plans.”405 Apparently, in support, Supreme Court decisions refer to this ERISA
provision as a safety net, offering relief not otherwise adequately met.406
Justice Scalia’s 2003 decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, seemingly
restrains the equitable relief available under ERISA.407 Over the objection of
400. See, e.g., J. Frank Vespa-Papaleo et al., The Legal, Medical, Economic & Social
Consequences of New Jersey’s Civil Union Law, N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM’N 9 (2008),
http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-.pdf (reporting that employees in civil
unions often must write in a description of their marital status into employment forms because they
do not explicitly enumerate “civil union” as a known marital status, even in states where civil unions
are recognized).
401. See Gary Shulman, QDROs—The Ticking Time Bomb, 23 FAM. ADVOC. 26, 29 (2001).
402. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1331.
403. Id. at 1332.
404. Id. at 1333 (referencing AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988)).
405. Id. at 1335.
406. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141 (1985).
407. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 259–62 (1993).
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four dissenting justices, the majority holds monetary awards are not
encompassed within the equitable relief referenced in ERISA § 1132(a)(3).408
The majority opinion separates relief normally given at law and that normally
given at equity, a duality long abandoned, “[m]oney damages are, of course, the
classic form of legal relief.”409 Since the text of § 1132(a)(3) references
equitable relief, Justice Scalia excludes monetary damages as a form of
restitution.410 Contrary to the majority’s construction of equitable relief,
Professor Langbein writes, “equity courts have constantly awarded money
damages to remedy breach of trust, which is why the Uniform Trust Code of
2000 has recently codified the practice.”411 While Mertens remains good law, it
does not alter the issue of whether § 1132(a)(3) may be read to encompass the
failure of plan managers to provide employees with adequate plan designation
forms that encompass current intent and accommodate changing circumstances.
Arguably, “the concept of ‘typically equitable’ has no ascertainable
meaning.”412 As Professor Langbein writes:
Because both the substantive and the remedial provisions of ERISA
arise from trust law, the likely meaning of ‘appropriate equitable
relief’ in ERISA is the panoply of remedies, specific and monetary,
including make-whole damages for consequential injury, which courts
of equity have for centuries applied to correct breaches of trust, and
which are ‘other’ than the ‘benefits due’ and injunctive relief that the
statute expressly authorizes earlier in [other provisions].413
One instance of equitable relief applied consistently to ERISA plan designated
beneficiaries involves slayer statutes. These statutes apply to designated
beneficiaries who receive the benefit because this same individual slayed the
person from whom he or she would be taking.414 Nonetheless, state law provides
that if a beneficiary “felonious[ly] and intentional[ly]” kills the person from
whom he or she would take then that person is deemed to predecease the
transferor and cannot take.415 The rationale for the slayer rule is that the
transferor did not intend the beneficiary to take if the taking were a result of the
beneficiary feloniously and intentionally killing the transferor. There is no
textual provision made in ERISA for voiding the taking of a beneficiary who

408. Id. at 253 (“We note at the outset that it is far from clear that, even if this provision does
make money damages available, it makes them available for the actions at issue here.”).
409. Id. at 255.
410. Id.
411. Langbein, supra note 1, at 1352 (citing UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(b)(3) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2001)).
412. Id. at 1353.
413. Id. at 1355.
414. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1687.
415. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); see also Langbein, supra note
5, at 1688 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011)).
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slays the transferor, yet “[n]o reported ERISA or FEGLIA case has ever allowed
the slayer to take.”416 Cases supporting federal preemption for other purposes
acknowledge that in the “ERISA context, these ‘slayer’ statutes could revoke the
beneficiary status of someone who murdered a plan participant.”417 Among
commentators, there remains mystery as to why federal courts are willing to use
slayer statutes to void a taking by “slayer beneficiaries,” but are unwilling to use
state statutes permitting revocation by operation of law upon divorce to void a
divorced spouse from taking.418
The comparison between statutes mandating revocation by operation of law
and the equitable voiding of the beneficiary status of slayers focuses on the
unjust enrichment of beneficiaries.419 Even though courts hold that state
divorces, and the subsequent financial settlements agreed to by both divorcing
parties, are preempted by ERISA’s requirement that proceeds be paid to the
plan’s designated beneficiary, the intent of the employee was that the former
spouse not be the beneficiary.420 AAnd although federal courts refuse to permit
state constructive trusts to alter distribution of ERISA proceeds,421 there is dicta
suggesting not all equity devices are forbidden, only those arising at the state
level, thereby suggesting that a federal approach is suitable.422 The Ninth
Circuit, in dicta, speculated in 2010 that:
We conclude that Congress did not intend to permit the reassignment
of surviving spouse benefits and, therefore the constructive trust
remedy that the state court tried to impose is also preempted by
ERISA. It may not be that all constructive trusts instituted by state
courts, particularly those that seek to recover ill-gotten gains, will have
a sufficient connection with or reference to an ERISA plan to trigger
ERISA’s preemption provision.423

416. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1692.
417. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001)
418. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 5, at 1689–93 (suggesting slayer statutes arise because of
federal common law). One commentator suggests that federal common law would precipitate
consolidated uncertainty. See Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1905–06.
419. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1679 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 48 (AM. LAW INST. 2011)).
420. See, e.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949 (2013) (holding that the former spouse
takes proceeds of decedent’s FEGLIA life insurance contract and that spouse cannot waive rights
without following procedures mandated by FEGLIA); Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1062
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding the divorce decree was an invalid waiver of the former wife’s right to the
surviving spousal benefits and that a constructive trust created by a state court was preempted by
ERISA).
421. See, e.g., Carmona, 603 F.3d at 1061 (“We agree that a state law constructive trust cannot
be used to contravene the dictates of ERISA.”).
422. Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause: Progress Towards a More Equitable
Preemption of State Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 207, 271 (2001) (citing Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton
Ret. Plan, 797 F. 2d 383, 390 (7th Cir. 1986)).
423. Carmona, 603 F.3d at 1062.
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Thus, a constructive trust, a remedy used to provide redress for the unjust
enrichment of a beneficiary, may be the proper equitable vehicle under §
1132(a)(3), by which to recover assets passing to a person unjustly enriched
because of the plan manager’s failure to inform.
Ostensibly, the best approach is to utilize the ERISA statute itself, specifically
§ 1132(a)(3), which provides for a participant or a beneficiary to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of the participant’s plan. First,
recourse is possible against plan managers for failing to provide employment
forms that sufficiently provide participants with knowledgeable options when
commencing employment, and then periodic updates to ascertain changes in the
participant’s intent. As fiduciaries, the plan managers owe a fiduciary duty to
the plan participants, a duty that is breached when there is inadequate
information disseminated to employees by which employees may make
intelligent decisions. Second, it is arguable that when plan proceeds are paid to
designated beneficiaries who knowingly waived all claim to those proceeds, that
named beneficiary is unjustly enriched by receipt of the proceeds. There exists
extensive history of unjust enrichment in state courts, but § 1132(a)(3) provides
the appropriate equitable relief justification for voiding the payment of those
proceeds to persons who are unjustly enriched.
The catalyst for resorting to the equitable remedy language of ERISA results
from a congruence of the following events:
First, federal courts consistently refuse to establish limits to the preemption
force of ERISA as applied to the states through the Supremacy Clause.424 The
future extent of federal ERISA preemption remains uncertain,425 but among the
federal circuits and repeatedly in the Supreme Court, efforts to apply state law
to ERISA plans, even laws traditionally left to the states for decades, like family
law and probate, are preempted to provide ease of plan administration.
Arguments suggesting that states can accommodate ERISA’s goal of ease of
administration because, for the most part, state laws are uniformly similar, are
suspicious indeed. As one commentator noted, “the downside of state laws is
that they offer administrators no single prototype to follow. What is more, state
laws of disclaimer have steadily fragmented over time.”426 Furthermore:
[T]he uniform acts for inheritance and disclaimer law, first
promulgated in 1969, have, if anything, exacerbated the tropism
toward diversity. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform
Probate Code and related products have never gained anything close
to universal adoption, but they did succeed in stirring things up,
encouraging more states to codify and to reexamine and fiddle with

424. Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme
Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 915–16 n.14 (2004).
425. See, e.g., Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1955–58 (Thomas, J., concurring) (implying preemption
should be used sparingly).
426. Hirsch, supra note 42, at 1904.
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statutes already in place . . . . As of today, some seventeen states have
enacted the latest version of the Uniform Probate Code’s provisions
on disclaimer (grafted into that code from a freestanding uniform
act)—and these have proliferated into seventeen different variations
of state laws.427
Second, arguments in favor of restricting federal preemption are consistently
rejected.428 More specifically, the arguments assert that: (1) the designated plan
beneficiary rule jeopardizes elective share statutes enacted to promote spousal
equality; (2) preemption conflicts with spousal waivers arising as part of divorce
decrees incorporated but not merged into divorce judgments; and (3) preemption
ignores the perceived intent of the plan participant. These arguments are
repeatedly debunked.
Third, because the plan proceeds are paid through nonprobate transfer
mechanisms, plan contracts involving pension and welfare benefits, at the
federal law level, do not match modern state laws that provide for revocation of
named beneficiaries upon divorce. These state statutes were enacted to apply to
all mechanisms but remain unexpressed in the plan designation rule of ERISA,
“[t]he [state] divorce revocation statutes exemplify the core policy value of state
wealth transfer law, which is to implement the transferor’s intent.”429
Fourth, plan managers are not providing accountholders with forms that
adequately prompt them to foresee and account for significant life changes that
might alter their preferences: “an intelligent and careful nonlawyer reading these
forms would have difficulty understanding the potential impact they could have
on distribution of account assets.”430 The plethora of lawsuits involving
individuals other than designated beneficiaries of ERISA plans, combined with
the multiplication of judicial decisions, suggests that plan administrators are
negligent in managing plan documents. Specifically, plan managers are
negligent in “respecting management or disposition of [plan] assets.”431
Furthermore, as with investing assets, the plan managers owe a duty to monitor
and investigate and then to act in a prudent manner.432 There is at least a glimmer
that the Supreme Court may be willing to adopt a more aggressive posture

427. Id. at 1905.
428. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997) (“The QDRO provisions protect those
persons who, often as a result of divorce, might not receive the benefits they otherwise would have
had available during their retirement as a means of income. In the case of a predeceased spouse,
this concern is not implicated. The fairness of the distinction might be debated, but Congress has
decided to favor the living over the dead and we must respect its policy.”).
429. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1665.
430. Sterk & Leslie, supra note 2, at 202.
431. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 113 (1989).
432. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828–29 (2015).

Summer 2018]Equitable Relief for ERISA Benefit Plan Designation Mistakes 493

toward plan managers acting in a fiduciary capacity,433 certainly when coupled
with the reoccurring fact that the pension holder’s intended beneficiaries are
deprived of plan benefits because of the managers’ failure to inform.434 Section
1132(a)(3) provides a mechanism by which mistakes may be corrected without
resorting to state law, preemption analysis, or the unjust enrichment of
unintended beneficiaries.
IV. CONCLUSION
When ERISA was enacted in 1974 it was the product of public discussion and
intense deliberation, all meant to provide American workers with a fiscally
sound and administratively simple plan by which to safely plan for retirement.
Likewise, it provided employers with tax incentives and a bold initiative to
stimulate worker productivity and employment stability. These goals were
accomplished. To manage the pension and welfare plans envisioned by ERISA,
Congress mandated efficiency, dodging varying state laws through federal
preemption, specifying what is now known as the plan beneficiary designation
rule. Without anticipation, society evolved. No-fault divorce precipitated a
significant rise in the number of divorces and remarriages, gender equality took
hold of spouses, and the transfer of wealth shifted from probate devices, such as
a last will and testament, to nonprobate contract beneficiaries, common with
pension funds and life insurance policies. What remains constant, are the
mistakes that individuals make, often planning to update contracts and forms,
but mistakenly waiting until it is too late. The road to hell is paved with good
intentions.
Sadly, human mistakes became entangled with ERISA’s preemption of state
laws, the plan beneficiary designation rule, and the frequency of divorce. States
enacted laws specifying that if a person divorces, the former spouse is treated as
predeceased for purposes of inheritance under last wills and testaments, but also
under nonprobate contracts. The public and attorneys practicing estate planning
and divorce law became familiar with these state laws and perhaps mistakenly
relied upon them to their detriment. ERISA did not accommodate revocation by
divorce within its terms and as a result, many former spouses received pension
and life insurance benefits from former spouses. This reality precipitated

433. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2467 (2014) (holding the
same standard of prudence applies to ERISA fiduciaries, discarding the presumption that Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) fiduciaries act prudently).
434. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646.
It is grossly unfair to hold an employee accountable for acts which disqualify him from
benefits, if he had no knowledge of these acts, or if these conditions were stated in a
misleading or incomprehensible manner in plan booklets. Subcommittee findings were
abundant in establishing that an average plan participant, even where he has been
furnished an explanation of his plan provisions, often cannot comprehend them because
of the technicalities and complexities of the language used.
Id.
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multiple cases in state and federal courts arguing for state law’s application, that
federal common law can accommodate state law, or that former spouses should
be equitably estopped from receiving proceeds that were intentionally waived.
To date, all of these arguments are to no avail. The cases are legion.
ERISA plan managers are presumptively aware of disconnect between a plan
holder’s intent and the plan beneficiary designation rule. Nonetheless, very few
plan managers provide forms used by plan holders adequately explaining the
current and future options that employees may consider when designating a
beneficiary. Furthermore, very few plan managers periodically make inquiry of
plan holders as to changes in designation intent or current status arrangements.
These failures result in the unjust enrichment of unintended beneficiaries, a
failure of plan managers to inform, make inquiry, and to assist plan holders
express a conscious and informed consent. This Article argues that this breach
of fiduciary duty is actionable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) of ERISA, which
provides that a participant, beneficiary, or a fiduciary may obtain appropriate
equitable relief to redress this breach. Rather than lament encroaching
federalism, the failure of Congress to act, or the unintentionality of human
mistakes, this Article argues for holding plan managers to the accountability
ERISA envisions as the best guarantee to reverse the number of unintended
beneficiaries of pension and insurance policies.

